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Randy Borum 
 
As part of the ongoing effort to better understand the causes, motivations and determinants of 
terrorist behavior, based on a comprehensive review of the scientific and professional literature, 
this report analyzes key findings on the “psychology of terrorism.”   
 
• Although early writings on the “psychology of terrorism” were based mostly in psychoanalytic 
theory (e.g., narcissism, hostility toward parents), most researchers have since moved on to other 
approaches. 
• People become terrorists in different ways, in different roles, and for different reasons. It may be 
helpful to distinguish between reasons for joining, remaining in, and leaving terrorist organizations. 
• Perceived injustice, need for identity and need for belonging are common vulnerabilities among 
potential terrorists. 
• Mental illness is not a critical factor in explaining terrorist behavior.  Also, most terrorists are not 
“psychopaths.”   
• There is no “terrorist personality”, nor is there any accurate profile – psychologically or otherwise – 
of the terrorist.    
• Histories of childhood abuse and trauma and themes of perceived injustice and humiliation often 
are prominent in terrorist biographies, but do not really help to explain terrorism.   
• Terrorist ideologies tend to provide a set of beliefs that justify and mandate certain behaviors.  
Those beliefs are regarded as absolute, and the behaviors are seen as serving a meaningful 
cause.   
• Not all extremist ideologies promote violence, nor are all extremists violent.  One might ask 
whether the ideology is driven more by promotion of the “cause” or destruction of those who 
oppose it.    
• The powerful, naturally-occurring barriers that inhibit human killing can be eroded either through 
outside social/environmental influences or by changing how one perceives the situation.   
• Terrorist groups, like all social collectives, have certain internal (e.g., mistrust, competition) and 
external (e.g. support, inter-group conflict) vulnerabilities to their existence.   
• Surprisingly little research or analysis has been conducted on terrorist recruitment.  Recruitment 
efforts do appear concentrated in areas where people feel most deprived and dissatisfied.  
Relationships are critical.  Effective recruiters create and exploit a sense of urgency and 
imminence. 
• Effective leaders of terrorist organizations must be able to: maintain a collective belief system; 
establish and maintain organizational routines; control the flow of communication; manipulate 
incentives (and purposive goals) for followers; deflect conflict to external targets; and keep action 
going. 
• Research on the psychology of terrorism largely lacks substance and rigor.  Cultural factors are 
important, but have not been studied.  Future research should be operationally-informed; maintain 
a behavior based focus; and derive interpretations from analyses of incident-related behaviors. 
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Section 
1  
Introduction 
In the current national security environment, there is little question that 
terrorism is among the gravest of threats.  Massive resources 
throughout the government and private sectors have been allocated and 
re-allocated to the task of preventing terrorism.  These efforts, however, 
often lack a conceptual - let alone empirically-based – foundation for 
understanding terrorists and their acts of violence.  This void creates a 
serious challenge at many levels, from policy-level decisions about how 
a state should respond to terrorism, to individual-level decisions about 
whether a given person of interest, who espouses extremist ideas, truly 
poses a serious threat to U.S. personnel, assets, and interests. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze and synthesize what has been 
reported from the scientific and professional literature about the 
“psychology of terrorism.”  This focus is not intended to suggest that the 
scientific discipline of psychology provides the only, or even necessarily 
the best, analytic framework for understanding terrorism.  Like all 
approaches to understanding or explaining human behavior, a 
psychological approach has advantages and limitations.  Nevertheless, 
as psychology is regarded as “the science of human behavior,” it seems 
a reasonable, and potentially productive, line of inquiry. 
Although the basic question of how best to define terrorism has itself 
been a vexing problem, for purposes of this analysis, we are concerned 
generally with acts of violence (as opposed to threats or more general 
coercion) intentionally perpetrated on civilian non-combatants with the 
goal of furthering some ideological, religious or political objective. Our 
focus on psychological dimensions, de-emphasizes analysis of 
sociologically-based explanations (sometimes referred to as “root 
causes”) or macro-level economic and political theories.  Moreover, our 
focus on terrorist acts de-emphasizes analysis of the psychological 
effects, consequences or amelioration of terrorism. 
In many ways, our basic aim is rather modest.  We do not anticipate 
identifying or discovering THE explanation for all terrorism.  Rather, we 
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hope to identify, describe, and evaluate what contribution – if any – 
psychological theory or research may have made to understanding 
terrorists and terrorism.  In approaching this task, we are mindful of 
Walter Laqueur’s incisive conclusion based on more than a quarter 
century of personal research on the topic:  “Many terrorisms exist, and 
their character has changed over time and from country to country. The 
endeavor to find a "general theory" of terrorism, one overall explanation 
of its roots, is a futile and misguided enterprise. ..Terrorism has 
changed over time and so have the terrorists, their motives, and the 
causes of terrorism.” (Laqueur, 20031).  Psychiatrist Jerrold Post makes 
that caveat even more directly applicable to an exploration of the 
psychological dimension of terrorism.  He cautions that “there is a broad 
spectrum of terrorist groups and organizations, each of which has a 
different psychology, motivation and decision making structure. Indeed, 
one should not speak of terrorist psychology in the singular, but rather 
of terrorist psychologies” (Post, 20012).  With that cautionary note, we 
offer the following review.    
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Section 
2  
Aims & Methodology 
We have defined terrorism here as “acts of violence intentionally 
perpetrated on civilian non-combatants with the goal of furthering some 
ideological, religious or political objective.”  Our principal focus is on 
non-state actors.   
Our task was to identify and analyze the scientific and professional 
social science literature pertaining to the psychological and/or 
behavioral dimensions of terrorist behavior (not on victimization or 
effects).  Our objectives were to explore what questions pertaining to 
terrorist groups and behavior had been asked by social science 
researchers; to identify the main findings from that research; and 
attempt to distill and summarize them within a framework of 
operationally relevant questions.   
 
Search Strategy 
To identify the relevant social science literature, we began by searching 
a series of major academic databases using a systematic, iterative 
keyword strategy, mapping, where possible onto existing subject 
headings.  The focus was on locating professional social science 
literature published in major books or in peer-reviewed journals.  The 
following database searches were conducted in October, 2003. 
• Sociofile/Sociological Abstracts 
• Criminal Justice Abstracts (CJ Abstracts) 
• Criminal Justice Periodical Index (CJPI) 
• National Criminal Justice Reference Service Abstracts 
(NCJRS) 
• PsychInfo 
• Medline 
• Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS) 
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The “hit count” from those searches is summarized in the table below.  
After the initial list was generated, we cross-checked the citations 
against the reference list of several major review works that had been 
published in the preceding five years (e.g., Rex Hudson’s “The 
Psychology and Sociology of Terrorism”3) and included potentially 
relevant references that were not already on the list.  Finally, the list was 
submitted to the three senior academic consultants on the project:  Dr. 
Martha Crenshaw (Wesleyan University), Dr. John Horgan (University 
College, Cork), and Dr. Andrew Silke (UK Home Office) soliciting 
recommendations based only on relevance (not merit) as to whether 
any of the citations listed should be removed and whether they knew of 
others that met the criteria that should be added.  Reviews mainly 
suggested additions (rarely recommending removal) to the list.  
Revisions were made in response to reviewer comments, and the 
remaining comprised our final citation list.   
 
Psych Info Medline CJPI  NCJRS 
CJ 
Abstracts PAIS SocioFile
Terrorism     50   
Terror* (kw) 844  1353 N/A N/A  2115
Terror* (kw) & 
Mindset 1 (0) 0 4(0) Boolean 33 (0)  10 (0) 2 (0) 
Terror* (kw) & 
Psych* (kw) N/A 428 141 N/A N/A  N/A 
Terrorism  and 
Mindset N/A N/A N/A N/A 1 N/A N/A 
Psychology(Sub) 
& Terror*(kw)  50 17 (0) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Psychology(Sub) 
& Terrorism (Sub) 35 11 (0) N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Psychology & 
Terrorism N/A N/A N/A Boolean 154 (0) 14 23 28 
Political Violence 
(kw) 55 764(0) 89 (0) Boolean 19 50 N/A N/A 
Political Violence 
(kw) & 
Psychology N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 10 (0) 149 
        
 
 
Numbers= Total results 
N/A= Search Term 
unnecessary 
(0)=No items were kept from 
the results 
kw=keyword 
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Section 
3  
Psychological Approaches to   
Understanding Violence 
Before exploring psychological approaches to the specific problem of 
terrorist violence, it may be helpful first to examine whether and how 
psychology and other behavioral sciences have sought to explain 
violent behavior more generally.  Definitions of “violence” in the social 
science literature are at least as plentiful as definitions of terrorism.  
Most focus on causing harm to others, but some also include suicide 
and self-mutilation as forms of “violence to self.”  Acts that intentionally 
cause physical harm or injury to another person would fit within most 
definitions.  Yet many would insist that those parameters are much too 
narrow and restrictive to provide any meaningful description of violence.  
They might argue that threats as well as overt acts be included, that 
psychological or emotional harm is as relevant as physical harm, and 
that injury is merely an outcome and not a descriptor of the act.   On the 
other hand, some would contend that “intentional harm” is too restrictive 
because it would include legitimate behavior in some contact sports or 
consensual infliction of pain. 
Of what practical relevance is such an arcane definitional discussion 
among pointy-headed academics to someone who has to deal with 
understanding violence in the real world?  A fair question. 
Consider the following incidents: 
• A 25-year old man drinks and beats his live-in girlfriend at least 
three times a week. 
 
• A 17-year old girl who was thrown out of her parents’ house 
when she got pregnant and decided to keep the baby, now has a 
9 month old colicky infant who has never slept through the night, 
and who screams so loudly and so persistently that the mom has 
vigorously shaken the youngster, just to get him to stop. 
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• A 53-year old man is known to lurk around playgrounds and 
summer campsites looking for young pre-pubescent boys who he 
then takes to a prepared location where he rapes them.  Once he 
even killed a 10-year old boy. 
 
• A 20-year woman has spent her entire life in an area where 
people of her ethnicity are marginalized and oppressed by the 
state.  After two years of serving in a “first aid corps” of a militant 
resistance movement – and having her family killed in a raid by 
state soldiers – her anger and hatred toward the state has welled 
within her to the point that all she can think about is revenge.  
She dons an explosive-laden vest, and with a determination 
borne of rage, she heads toward a nearby military checkpoint, 
disguised as an expectant mother. 
 
• A 30-year old man was born into the longstanding, intense 
religious and political strife of his homeland.  His father is a 
university professor who is constantly watched by state security 
authorities, both because of his own radical religious involvement 
and because of family connections to known religious-based 
terrorists.  The man is described by others as quiet, serious, and 
devout.  He has been involved in coordinating and recruiting for a 
militant jihadist group that is widely known to be a terrorist 
organization. 
Many people would view each of these cases as involving violence, but 
one might expect to understand or prevent the violence in such cases in 
very different ways.  The personal and situational factors involved – and 
the extent of their contribution – might reasonably be expected to vary in 
these diverse circumstances.  Yet, at a broad level, they might all be 
similarly classified as “violent.”  What might “cause” or “explain” 
behavior in one of these cases, might not in another.  The point here is 
not to resolve the longstanding definitional debate, but to illustrate how 
the way in which practitioners and researchers view the problem of 
violence affects practical issues and decisions in the “real world.”   
One observation about causes that generally seems to be true and 
supported by the best available research is that violence is “caused” by 
multiple factors, many of which are strongly related to - and even affect - 
each other. The dichotomy of “Nature vs. Nurture” in explaining any 
form of human behavior, including violence, is outdated and inconsistent 
with the current state of research in the field.  Violence is “caused” by a 
complex interaction of biological, social/contextual, cognitive, and 
emotional factors that occur over time. Some causes will be more 
prominent than others for certain individuals and for certain types of 
violence and aggression.   
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A second general observation is that most violence can be usefully 
viewed as intentional.  It is chosen as a strategy of action.  It is 
purposeful (goal-directed) and intended to achieve some valued 
outcome for the actor.   It is not the product of innate, instinctual drives4, 
nor is it the inevitable consequence of predetermining psychological and 
social forces.  Obviously, many factors influence that decision and the 
competing options available, but humans typically are not passive 
vessels for involuntary displays of behavior.  Certainly, there are 
exceptions.  One can conceive of circumstances where an individual 
might have some brain dysfunction that causes general disinhibition 
and/or emotional instability that may result in aggression or violence.  
This would be inconsistent, though, with the kind of organization and 
planning necessary to carry out a terrorist attack. 
THEORETICAL APPROACHES 
In reviewing explanatory theories and empirical models, it is perhaps not 
surprising to learn that the discipline of psychology has yet to develop or 
discover (much less agree upon) any that substantially explain violent 
behavior, particularly across its many contexts, motivations and actors.  
The problem is not that researchers, scholars and practitioners have not 
tried to locate such an explanation, but the “holy grail” has proved to be 
elusive.  In fact, it is probably fair to say that psychological theoretical 
development in explaining violence has been given less attention, and 
has made less progress than in many behavioral realms of substantially 
lesser social importance or consequence.  
What are some of the main psychological theories that have been 
applied to understanding violence? 
Instinct Theory 
Psychoanalytic:  “The most widely recognized theory that addresses 
the roots of all forms of violence is the psychoanalytic model. Despite its 
influence on writers in the political science, sociology, history, and 
criminology literature, this model has weak logical, theoretical, and 
empirical foundations” (Beck, 20025).  Freud viewed aggression more 
generally as an innate and instinctual human trait, which most should 
outgrow in the normal course of human development.  A later 
development in Freud’s theory was that humans had the energy of life 
force (eros) and death force (thanatos) that sought internal balance6. 
Violence was seen as the “displacement” of thanatos from self and onto 
others. A number of more narrow violence-related theories have drawn 
on psychoanalytic concepts and ideas, but none are widely regarded as 
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psychoanalytic theories of violence.    
 
Ethology:  Ethology has been alternately defined as the scientific study 
of animal behavior, especially as it occurs in a natural environment and 
as the study of human ethos, and its formation (American Heritage 
Dictionary, 2000).  Ethologist, Konrad Lorenz advanced the notion that 
aggression arises from a very basic biological need - a “fighting instinct” 
that has had adaptive value as humans have evolved.  He argued the 
drive from aggression is innate and that, in humans, only its mode of 
expression is learned through exposure to, and interaction with the 
environment.  The theory of an instinctual drive for aggression suggests 
that it builds up over time, is fueled by emotional or psychophysiological 
arousal, and is subsequently discharged by a process of catharsis, 
which ostensibly decreases drive.  Empirical research, including 
physiologic studies, however, do not support this “hydraulic” (building 
until discharge, then receding) theory of aggressive energy.  Moreover, 
anthropologists and other social scientists have found significant 
differences both in the nature and level of aggression in different 
cultures, and experimental research has demonstrated that aggression 
can be environmentally manipulated; both findings that argue against a 
universal human instinct.   
 
Drive Theory (Frustration-Aggression) 
Frustration-Aggression:  The link between frustration (being 
prevented from attaining a goal or engaging in behavior) and aggression 
has been discussed in psychology for more than half a century.  Some 
even view it as a “master explanation” for understanding the cause of 
human violence.  The basic premise of the frustration-aggression (FA) 
hypothesis is twofold:  (1) Aggression is always produced by frustration, 
and (2) Frustration always produces aggression.  When subjected to 
empirical scrutiny, however, research has shown that frustration does 
not inevitably lead to aggression.  Sometimes, for example, it results in 
problem solving or dependent behaviors.  And aggression is known to 
occur even in the absence of frustration. Thus it is not reasonable to 
view frustration alone as a necessary and sufficient causal factor.  In an 
important reformulation of the FA hypothesis, Berkowitz (19897) posited 
that it was only “aversive” frustration that would lead to aggression. The 
newly proposed progression was that frustration would lead to anger, 
and that anger – in the presence of aggressive cues – would lead to 
aggression.   While subsequent research findings have, at times, been 
inconsistent or contradictory, “it is reasonable to conclude that aversive 
stimuli do facilitate, but probably not instigate, aggressive behavior” 
(Tedeschi & Felson, 1994, p. 688).  In a now classic work, Ted Gurr was 
among the first to apply a systematic FA analysis to the problem of 
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political violence, framing the frustration as one of “relative deprivation” 
(Gurr, 19689). 
 
Social Learning Theory 
Fundamental learning theory suggests that behavioral patterns are 
acquired by links (contingencies) established between the behavior and 
its consequences.  When behavior is followed by desired results 
(reward), that behavior is “reinforced” (made more likely).  Conversely, 
when behavior is followed by undesirable or aversive consequence, that 
behavior is “punished” (made less likely).  Social learning theory is a 
simple extension of this basic idea, suggesting that behavior (e.g., 
aggression) is learned not only through one’s direct experience, but also 
through observation of how such contingencies occur in one’s 
environment.  Some have referred to this as vicarious learning.  In this 
model, aggression is viewed as learned behavior.  Accordingly, it is 
argued that through observation we learn consequences for the 
behavior, how to do it, to whom it should be directed, what provocation 
justifies it, and when it is appropriate.  “If aggression is a learned 
behavior, then terrorism, a specific type of aggressive behavior, can 
also be learned” (Oots & Wiegele, 1985, p. 1110). 
 
Cognitive Theory 
The core elements in a “cognitive theory” of aggression derive from an 
area of study called “social cognition.”   The basic notion is that people 
interact with their environment based on how they perceive and interpret 
it. That is, people form an internal (cognitive) map of their external 
(social) environment, and these perceptions – rather than an objective 
external reality – determine their behavior.  The experimental literature 
clearly suggests that perceptions of intent affect aggression.  Moreover, 
there are internal and external factors that can affect one’s perceptions 
of provocation or intent.  Two common cognitive/processing deficits 
found among people who are highly aggressive are:  (1) an inability to 
generate non-aggressive solutions to conflicts (and lack of confidence in 
their ability to use them successfully) and (2) a perceptual 
hypersensitivity to hostile/aggressive cues in the environment, 
particularly interpersonal cues11. 
 
Crenshaw suggests that the principles of social cognition apply both to 
terrorists and to their organizations.  She notes “the actions of terrorists 
are based on a subjective interpretation of the world rather than 
objective reality.  Perceptions of the political and social environment are 
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filtered through beliefs and attitudes that reflect experiences and 
memories” (Crenshaw, 198812, p. 12). 
 
Biological Approaches 
Consideration of biological factors affecting aggression does not 
constitute a theory, in any formal sense.  Nevertheless they are an 
important element in a comprehensive biopsychosocial understanding 
of behavior.  Oots and Wiegele (198513) argue that “social scientists 
who seek to understand terrorism should take account of the possibility 
that biological or physiological variables may play a role in bringing an 
individual to the point of performing an act of terrorism” (p. 17).  Yet, it is 
rare that any biological studies are conducted on terrorists. One notable 
exception is an early finding by psychiatrist David Hubbard that a 
substantial portion of the terrorists he examined clinically suffered from 
some form of inner-ear problems or “vestibular dysfunction.”   This 
finding has not been replicated, however, nor is there a clear theoretical 
rationale for a potential link to terrorism.  With that said, we offer here 
only the most basic, cursory review of current knowledge on biological 
factors influencing aggression. 
 
Neurochemical Factors14 :   Serotonin (5-HT), of all neurotransmitters in 
the mammalian brain, has received the most research attention and has 
shown the most consistent association with aggressive behavior.  Lower 
levels of serotonin have been linked to higher levels of aggression in 
normal, clinical, and offender samples.  The association between 5-HT 
deficits and aggression seem to be specific to (or at least principally 
affect) impulsive, rather than premeditated aggressive behavior, which 
also appears to be mediated by perceived threat or provocation.  Low 
levels of 5-HT may heighten one’s sensitivity or reactivity to cues of 
hostility or provocation.  “In the absence of provocative stimuli, 
decreased 5HT functioning may have little effect on the level of 
aggressive behavior exhibited by humans (Smith, 1986)” (Berman, 
Kavoussi, & Coccaro, 1997,  p. 309). Because Serotonin is primarily an 
inhibitory neurotransmitter, it is possible that deficits in 5-HT reduce 
inhibition of aggressive ideas/impulses that would otherwise be 
suppressed – there is not real evidence that it creates them. 
As neurotransmitters, Norepinephrine NE may affect arousal and 
environmental sensitivity and Dopamine DA may affect behavioral 
activation and goal-directed behavior.   
 
“Compared to serotonin, the relationship between both dopamine and 
norepinephrine and human aggression is less clear” (Berman, Kavoussi, 
& Coccaro, 1997, p. 309).  Although some studies have linked low 
levels of DA to increases in aggression (particularly impulsive 
aggression), DA and 5-HT levels are correlated (they travel together) so 
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it is particularly uncertain whether DA has any relationship to aggressive 
behavior independent of the effect of 5-HT.   
 
Hormonal Factors15:  The effects of androgens / gonadotropic hormones 
on human behavior – particularly aggressive behavior – are weaker and 
more complex than one might expect.  There is not good empirical 
evidence to support “testosterone poisoning” as a cause of 
disproportionate violence in males.  Testosterone has – at best – a 
limited role.16 A meta-analysis of the relationship between testosterone 
and scores on the Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory (Archer, 1991) 
showed a “low but positive relationship between T levels and the overall 
inventory score of 230 males tested over five studies” (Brain & Susman, 
1997, p. 319). 
 
Psychophysiological Factors:  Lower than average levels of arousal 
(e.g., low resting heart rate) and low reactivity are consistently found in 
studies of people who engage in aggressive and antisocial behavior 
(Raine, 1993, 199717).  
 
Neuropsychological Factors: Cognitive abilities relating to self-
awareness and self-control are referred to as “executive functions.”  The 
frontal lobe of the brain, and the prefrontal cortex in particular, has been 
identified as the primary neuroanatomic site of these functions.   
“Evidence of the relation between executive deficits and aggression has 
been found among incarcerated subjects, among normal subjects in 
laboratory situations, and among nonselected populations.  Effect sizes 
are small to moderate, but consistent and robust18. Theoretical and 
empirical evidence suggests that dysfunction or impairment in the 
prefrontal cortex may be responsible for the psychophysiologic deficits 
found in people who engage in antisocial and aggressive behavior 
(Raine, 1993, 199719).  Specifically, brain imaging, neurological, and 
animal studies suggest that prefrontal dysfunction may account for low 
levels of arousal, low (stress) reactivity, and fearlessness. 
 
Raw Empirical Approaches 
In addition to these theoretically-based approaches, psychological 
researchers also have attempted to apply statistical models to explain 
violence and to identify its predictors. This line of inquiry has yielded 
some positive findings on risk factors for violent behavior. 
The use of risk factors in the behavioral sciences is a concept borrowed 
from the field of Public Health, specifically the discipline of epidemiology 
(the study of causes and course of diseases).  Technically, a risk factor 
is defined as “..an aspect of personal behavior or lifestyle, an 
environmental exposure, or an inborn or inherited characteristic which 
on the basis of epidemiological evidence is known to be associated with 
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Risk Factors for General Violence 
 
• Juvenile delinquency   .20
• Family problems          .19
• Antisocial personality  .18
• Hospital admissions     .17
• Violent history             .16
• Institutional adjustment .14
• Adult criminal history       .14
• Unmarried                   .13
 
Numbers represent “effect sizes” from a meta-
analysisbyBonta Laws&Hanson 1998
health- related condition(s) considered important to prevent.20  Applied 
to this study, it is any factor, that when present, makes violence more 
likely than when it is absent.  
Notice that this definition does not imply anything about causation.  It is 
possible to identify risk factors, without a clear understanding of the 
causal mechanisms by which they operate.  In fact, this is why we have 
a well-developed base of empirical knowledge on risk factors for 
violence and so little explanation of its cause. 
 
Literally hundreds of studies in 
psychology, criminology, sociology, and 
other behavioral sciences have yielded 
significant risk factors for violence.  Risk 
factors have been classified as broadly 
falling into two categories:  static and 
dynamic.  Static risk factors are those 
that are historical (e.g., early onset of 
violence) or dispositional (e.g., gender) 
in nature, and that are unlikely to 
change over time.  Dynamic factors are 
typically individual, social or situational 
factors that often do change (e.g., 
attitudes, associates, high levels of stress) and, therefore might be more 
amenable to modification through intervention21.   
While it may be tempting to apply these risk factors to determine risk for 
terrorism, they are unlikely to be useful predictors.  Although terrorism is 
a type of violence, risk factors tend to operate differently at different 
ages, in different groups, and for different – specific - types of violent 
behavior.   For example, the factors that predict violent behavior in the 
urban gang member with a drug addiction often differ from those that 
predict violence among predatory child molesters or perpetrators of 
domestic violence.  
 
Most of the risk factor research in the social sciences has focused on 
predicting “general violence risk.”  General violence risk here represents 
the likelihood that an individual might engage in any aggressive act 
toward anyone over a specified period of time.  That is not the question 
posed in terrorist threat assessments.  Most people who have a 
collection of general violence risk factors will never engage in terrorism.  
Conversely, many known terrorists – including some field leaders of the 
9/11 attacks – did not have a large number of key general violence risk 
factors, although they were actively preparing to engage in acts of 
terrorism.   That the correlates of general violence and terrorism are 
different has at least two important implications:  (1) it is likely that the 
causal (explanatory) mechanisms also are different; (2) one cannot 
reasonably use the risk factors from one to predict the other.   
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Conclusion 
No single theory has gained ascendance as an explanatory model for all 
types of violence.  Perhaps the diversity in behaviors regarded as 
violent poses an inherent barrier to such a global theory.  Social 
learning and social cognition approaches have received some of the 
most extensive empirical attention and support, but not necessarily for 
terrorism specifically.  Terrorist violence most often is deliberate (not 
impulsive), strategic, and instrumental; it is linked to and justified by 
ideological (e.g., political, religious) objectives and almost always 
involves a group or multiple actors/supporters.  These issues all add 
complexity to the construction of terrorism as a form of violence and 
challenge the emergence of a unifying explanatory theory.
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Section 
4  
First Generation of Psychological 
Research on Terrorism  
The “first generation” of psychological research on terrorism is not 
officially designated or bounded by any time period, but for purposes of 
this discussion, will roughly encompass a term from the late 1960s to 
the mid-1980s.  The term “research” is used loosely, as virtually none of 
the professional literature was based on any empirical studies.   Rather, 
the writings that were produced were based largely on clinical 
speculations and theoretical formulations, most of which were rooted in 
a psychoanalytic tradition.  Terrorism was pathologized as manifestation 
of psychological and behavioral deviance.  Accordingly, within a 
psychoanalytic framework, the “psychopathology of terrorism” was 
believed to be driven by unconscious motives and impulses, which had 
their origins in childhood. 
Psychoanalytic Theory 
Freud wrote: “one has, I think, to reckon with the fact that there are 
present in all men destructive, and therefore anti-social and anti-cultural, 
trends and that in a great number of people these are strong enough to 
determine their behavior in human society” (Freud, 1927, p.7). Early 
writings on psychological dimensions of terrorist behavior were 
dominated by psychoanalytic formulations, reflecting, in part, the 
prevailing theoretical orientation in clinical practice at the time.  The two 
themes consistently at the center of these formulations were (1) that 
motives for terrorism are largely unconscious and arise from hostility 
toward one’s parents and (2) that terrorism is the product of early abuse 
and maltreatment.   
 
One of the earliest examples of the former was Feuer’s (196922) “conflict 
of generations” theory, “which is based on a Freudian interpretation of 
terrorism as a psychological reaction of sons against fathers, a 
generational phenomenon rooted in the Oedipus complex and, thus, in 
maleness” (Crenshaw, 1986, p. 390-39123).  The idea that terrorism is 
rooted in childhood abuse (often unconscious sequelae) is a relatively 
common theme, and is still held by some contemporary analysts.  
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Psychohistorian Lloyd De Mause (200224) observes that “The roots of 
terrorism lie not in this or that American foreign policy error, but in the 
extremely abusive families of the terrorists.”   
 
Narcissism 
Many first generation attempts to understand and explain terrorism 
within a psychodynamic framework, focused on the trait of narcissism 
as a defining and driving factor (Crayton, 198325).  “The possible linkage 
between narcissism and terrorism was first advanced by Morf (197026) 
and subsequently discussed by Lasch (1979), Crayton (1983), Haynal 
et al. (1983), Post (1984, 1986, 1990), and Pearlstein (1991)” 
(McCormick, 200327).  The premise was that terrorist behavior was 
rooted in a personality defect that produced a damaged sense of self.  
The essence of pathological narcissism is an overvaluing of self and a 
devaluing of others.  It is not difficult to see how one might observe 
these traits among terrorists.   In fact, political scientist Richard 
Pearlstein concluded:  “the psychoanalytic concept of narcissism is the 
most complete and thus most intellectually satisfying theory regarding 
the personal logic of political terrorism.” 
 
Crayton (198328), for example, posed the “psychology of narcissism” as 
a framework for understanding (not excusing) terrorist behavior, using 
Kohut’s concepts to guide his argument.  According to Clayton, the two 
key narcissistic dynamics are a grandiose sense of self and “idealized 
parental imago” (“If I can’t be perfect, at least I’m in a relationship with 
something perfect”).  With regard to the effect of groups, he argues that 
narcissistically vulnerable persons are drawn to charismatic leaders and 
that some groups are held together by a shared grandiose sense of self. 
As others have posited, he suggested that narcissistic rage is what 
prompts an aggressive response to perceived injustice. 
 
Indeed “narcissistic rage” has been posed by more than one observer 
as the primary psychological precipitant of terrorist aggression.  In 
developmental context the way in which this evolves is that as children 
the nascent terrorists are deeply traumatized, suffering chronic physical 
abuse and emotional humiliation.  This creates a profound sense of fear 
and personal vulnerability that becomes central to their self concept.  To 
eliminate this fear and create a more tolerable self-image, such 
individuals feel the need to "kill off" their view of themselves as victims.  
They buttress their own self-esteem by devaluing others.  The result of 
this devaluation of others - what some have termed "malignant 
narcissism" - muffles their internal voice of reason and morality.  
Furthermore, whatever sense of “esteem” has developed in that process 
is extraordinarily fragile.  This makes the individual particularly 
vulnerable to any slights, insults or ideas that threaten to shatter the 
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façade of self-worth.  Such insults are known as “narcissistic injuries” 
and are the triggers of narcissistic rage (Akhtar, 199929). 
 
The influence of psychoanalytic formulations generally, and emphasis 
on narcissism specifically, has abated considerably in contemporary 
research.  While some cling to – or attempt to reify - old ideas, these 
first generation notions did not generate much empirical support.  Most 
current experts in the field have moved on to other approaches in 
search of more accurate and more useful insights for understanding 
terrorists.  
Early Typologies 
Some of the first generation conceptualizations and writings began to 
presage Laqueur’s notion that there is not one terrorism, but many 
terrorisms.  Typologies began to emerge to categorize and classify 
terrorist groups, acts, and actors.  Focusing on the diversity in 
motivations, psychiatrist Frederick Hacker proposed one of the first 
psychological typologies.  His 1976 book, Crusaders, Criminals and 
Crazies30, was perhaps the first major popular press release on the 
psychology of terrorism.  Although Hacker’s formulations did have a 
psychoanalytic bent, they were also much broader than those of his 
contemporary writers.  His book introduced the now popular and 
colloquial terrorist typology of Crusaders (idealistically inspired and 
acting in service of a higher cause), Criminals (who simply use terrorism 
for personal gain) and Crazies (often motivated by false beliefs and 
perceptions arising from their mental illness).   Hacker notes 
immediately (and correctly) “of course, the pure type is rarely 
encountered.”  Nevertheless, this effort introduced the notion that there 
were differences among terrorists and that the phenomenon and the 
actors were not monolithic. 
 
A second notable effort was made in the early 1980s by former CIA 
psychiatrist, Jerrold Post.  Post (198431) built on the earlier models that 
sought to explain terrorism a form of psychopathology or personality 
defect, arguing that two different forms of dysfunction produced two 
different patterns of terrorist behavior.  The first type was the Anarchic-
ideologue.  These individuals were hypothesized to come from severely 
dysfunctional families where they likely had suffered severe abuse or 
maltreatment, leading them to have hostile feelings toward their parents.  
Their extremist ideology was a displacement of their rebellion and 
hostility onto the “state” authority.  That is, they acted out hostility by 
rebelling against the “state” of their parents.  In contrast, the second 
type, the Nationalist-secessionist was not hostile, but loyal to his 
parents, and his extremism was motivated to retaliate or avenge the 
wrongs done to his parents by the state.  In essence, they rebelled 
against external society out of loyalty to their parents.  Post (198432) 
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describes the distinction in the following way:  “for some, becoming 
terrorists is an act of retaliation for real and imagined hurts against the 
society of their parents; for others, it is an act of retaliation against 
society for the hurt done to their parents.” 
Conclusion 
While Hacker’s typology is still sometimes used as a practical point of 
reference, it is not considered an important scholarly classification.  
Similarly, Post’s dichotomous taxonomy, since its conception, has not 
been subjected to any empirical scrutiny and seems somewhat less 
relevant to the contemporary terrorist threat. 
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Section 
5  
Contemporary Psychological 
Research on Terrorism  
The first generation of psychological inquiry, drawing mainly from 
psychoanalytic theory, largely ran its course.  Its framework and findings 
mostly lacked operationally relevance. In this section we begin to review 
and evaluate the manner and extent to which social science research 
and professional literature describes or explains terrorism and related 
terrorist behavior.  While the scope of this tasking required a focus on 
psychological factors, broadly conceived, such factors cannot – in 
isolation – form a comprehensive explanation for, or theory of, terrorism. 
There are many factors at the macro and micro level that affect political 
violence generally, and terrorism specifically.  Indeed, “there is 
substantial agreement that the psychology of terrorism cannot be 
considered apart from political, historical, familial, group dynamic, 
organic, and even purely accidental, coincidental factors.” (Freid, 
198233).  With that acknowledgement we proceed next to focus on the 
contributions of psychological and behavior research and theory to the 
“psychology of terrorism.”  Hypotheses and assertions from first 
generation research are used to provide context, while more 
contemporary research focuses the findings in relation to the key study 
questions. 
 
The charge for this project was given by a U.S. intelligence agency with 
operational responsibilities.  Accordingly, we have chosen to organize 
the findings from this review around a series of functional questions that 
might have relevant operational implications 
 
 How and why do people enter, stay in, and leave terrorist 
organizations? 
 To what extent is psychopathology relevant for understanding or 
preventing terrorism? 
 To what extent is individual personality relevant for 
understanding or preventing terrorism? 
 To what extent are an individual’s life experiences relevant for 
understanding or preventing terrorism? 
 What is the role of ideology in terrorist behavior? 
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 What distinguishes extremists who act violently from those who 
do not? 
 What are the vulnerabilities of terrorist groups? 
 How do terrorist organizations form, function, and fail? 
How and why do people enter, stay in, and 
leave terrorist organizations? 
Better Answers Through Better Questions 
 
While early research seemed to focus almost exclusively in some way 
on “why” individuals become terrorists or engage in terrorism, the 
research questions in this realm, informed by a degree of experience, 
became more focused and more functional.  Horgan34 and others 
helped to frame future research, in part, by asking better questions.  
 
Implicit in the “why” question was an assumption that becoming a 
terrorist involved a discrete choice to change status.  Social and 
operational observations of numerous terrorist and extremist groups, 
however, suggest that recruitment and involvement typically do not 
occur in that way.  Indeed, as Horgan and Taylor (200135) have noted: 
“What we know of actual terrorists suggests that there is rarely a 
conscious decision made to become a terrorist.  Most involvement in 
terrorism results from gradual exposure and socialisation towards 
extreme behavior.” 
 
Seeking a better framework within which to examine the question of 
“why an individual becomes a terrorist” Crenshaw, for example, 
suggested that the issue of “why terrorists persist despite the risks 
involved and the uncertainty of reward is an important question” 
(Crenshaw, 198636).    Moreover, she notes that there is a high rate of 
attrition in terrorist organizations, which itself begs for a greater 
understanding of how and why some exit or leave terrorist organizations 
or even desist from terrorist behavior.    
 
Psychologists John Horgan and Max Taylor have structured the issues 
in a most perspicuous way for terrorism researchers by drawing on 
contributions from theoretical and developmental criminology “to 
consider involvement in terrorism as a process comprised of discrete 
phases to ‘becoming’ a terrorist, ‘being’ a terrorist (or what might be 
construed as both a) remaining involved and b) engaging in terrorist 
offences) and disengaging from terrorism” (Horgan, in press37). They 
suggest that “a fundamental distinction can be made then in analysing 
the factors at work at the different stages of becoming, remaining, and 
leaving or terminating involvement” (Horgan & Taylor, 200138). 
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Motives and Vulnerabilities 
 
Among the key psychological factors in understanding whether, how 
and which individuals in a given environment will enter the process of 
becoming a terrorist are motive and vulnerability.  By definition, motive 
is an emotion, desire, physiological need, or similar impulse that acts as 
an incitement to action, and vulnerability refers to susceptibility or 
liability to succumb, as to persuasion or temptation39.    
One’s motivation for engaging in terrorism is often presumed to be the 
“cause” or ideology of the group.  However, as Crenshaw (198540) 
notes, “the popular image of the terrorist as an individual motivated 
exclusively by deep and intransigent political commitment obscures a 
more complex reality.”  That reality is that motives to join a terrorist 
organization and to engage in terrorism vary considerably across 
different types of groups, and also within groups – and they may change 
over time. 
 
Martha Crenshaw (198541) for example, suggests that there are at least 
four categories of motivation among terrorists:  (1) the opportunity for 
action, (2) the need to belong, (3) the desire for social status, and (4) 
the acquisition of material reward.   Post (199042) has gone even further 
to suggest even that terrorism is an end unto itself, independent of any 
stated political or ideological objectives.  His argument is that “the cause 
is not the cause.  The cause, as codified in the group’s ideology, 
according to this line of reasoning, becomes the rationale for acts the 
terrorists are driven to commit.  Indeed, the central argument of this 
position is that individuals become terrorists in order to join terrorist 
groups and commit acts of terrorism” (p. 35).   
 
The quest to understand vulnerabilities should not be confused with a 
search for the “terrorist personality” (Horgan, 200343).    Horgan (in 
press44) has framed the issue of vulnerability in the perhaps most lucid 
and useful way as “factors that point to some people having a greater 
openness to increased engagement than others.”  Based on a review of 
the existing literature three motivational themes - injustice, identity, and 
belonging - appear to be prominent and consistent.  These themes also 
relate to one’s potential openness or vulnerability.   
 
Injustice:  Perceived injustice has long been recognized a central factor 
in understanding violence generally and terrorism specifically, dating 
back to some of the earliest writings.  In the mid-1970s, Hacker (197645) 
concluded that “remediable injustice is the basic motivation for 
terrorism”.  A desire for revenge or vengeance is a common response to 
redress or remediate a wrong of injustice inflicted on another.  It is not 
difficult to imagine that “one of the strongest motivations behind 
terrorism is vengeance, particularly the desire to avenge not oneself but 
others.  Vengeance can be specific or diffuse, but it is an obsessive 
drive that is a powerful motive for violence toward others, especially 
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people thought to be responsible for injustices” (Crenshaw, 199246).  
Perceptions of injustice may also be viewed as grievances, which Ross 
(199347, p. 326) has posed as the most important precipitant cause of 
terrorism.  He suggests such grievances may be economic, ethnic, 
racial, legal, political, religious, and/or social, and that they may be 
targeted to individuals, groups, institutions or categories of people. 
 
Identity:  One’s psychological identity is a developed, stable sense of 
self and resolved security in one’s basic values, attitudes, and beliefs.   
Developmentally, its formation typically occurs in a crisis of adolescence 
or young adulthood, and is tumultuous and emotionally challenging.  
However, “the successful development of personal identity is essential 
to the integrity and continuity of the personality” (Crenshaw, 198648, p. 
391).  An individual’s search for identity may draw him or her to 
extremist or terrorist organizations in a variety of ways.  One may fall 
into what psychologist Jim Marcia calls “identity foreclosure” where a 
role and set of ideas and values (an identity) are adopted without 
personal, critical examination.  The absolutist, “black and white” nature 
of most extremist ideologies is often attractive to those who feel 
overwhelmed by the complexity and stress of navigating a complicated 
world.   
 
A variant on this process is one in which an individual defines his or her 
identity simply through group membership.  Essentially, one’s personal 
identity is merged with a group identity, with no sense of (or need for) 
individuality or uniqueness.  As Johnson and Feldman (199249) suggest, 
"membership in a terrorist group provides a sense of identity or 
belonging for those personalities whose underlying sense of identity is 
flawed.” For these individuals, “belonging to the terrorist group becomes 
… the most important component of their psychosocial identity” Post 
(198750).  
 
A similar mechanism is one in which a desperate quest for personal 
meaning pushes an individual to adopt a role to advance a cause, with 
little or no thoughtful analysis or consideration of its merit.  In essence, 
the individual resolves the difficult question “Who am I?” by simply 
defining him or herself as a “terrorist,” a “freedom fighter,” ”shahid” or 
similar role (Della Porta, 199251; Knutson, 198152).    Taylor and Louis 
(200453) describe a classic set of circumstances for recruitment into a 
terrorist organization:  “These young people find themselves at a time in 
their life when they are looking to the future with the hope of engaging in 
meaningful behavior that will be satisfying and get them ahead.  Their 
objective circumstances including opportunities for advancement are 
virtually nonexistent; they find some direction for their religious collective 
identity but the desperately disadvantaged state of their community 
leaves them feeling marginalized and lost without a clearly defined 
collective identity” (p. 178). 
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Belonging:  In radical extremist groups, many prospective terrorists find 
not only a sense of meaning, but also a sense of belonging, 
connectedness and affiliation.  Luckabaugh and colleagues (199754) 
argue that among potential terrorists “the real cause or psychological 
motivation for joining is the great need for belonging.”  For these 
alienated individuals from the margins of society, joining a terrorist 
group represented the first real sense of belonging after a lifetime of 
rejection, and the terrorist group was to become the family they never 
had” (Post, 198455).  This strong sense of belonging has critical 
importance as a motivating factor for joining, a compelling reason for 
staying, and a forceful influence for acting56.  “Volkan (1997) .. argued 
that terrorist groups may provide a security of family by subjugating 
individuality to the group identity.  A protective cocoon is created that 
offers shelter from a hostile world” (Marsella, 200357).  Observations on 
terrorist recruitment show that many people are influenced to join by 
seeking solidarity with family, friends or acquaintances (Della Porta, 
199558), and that “for the individuals who become active terrorists, the 
initial attraction is often to the group, or community of believers, rather 
than to an abstract ideology or to violence”  (Crenshaw, 198859).  
Indeed, it is the image of such strong cohesiveness and solidarity 
among extremist groups that makes them more attractive than some 
prosocial collectives as a way to find belonging (Johnson & Feldman, 
198260).  
 
Conclusion:  These three factors - injustice, identity, and belonging – 
have been found often to co-occur in terrorists and to strongly influence 
decisions to enter terrorist organizations and to engage in terrorist 
activity.  Some analysts even have suggested that the synergistic effect 
of these dynamics forms the real “root cause” of terrorism, regardless of 
ideology.  Luckabaugh and colleagues (199761), for example, concluded 
“the real cause or psychological motivation for joining is the great need 
for belonging, a need to consolidate one's identity.  A need to belong, 
along with an incomplete personal identity, is a common factor that cuts 
across the groups.”  Jerrold Post (198462) has similarly theorized that 
“the need to belong, the need to have a stable identity, to resolve a split 
and be at one with oneself and with society- … is an important bridging 
concept which helps explain the similarity in behavior of terrorists in 
groups of widely different espoused motivations and composition.”  
 
Pathways to Radicalization & Terrorism 
  
As important as these motivational factors may be, as Bruce (1997) 
observes, to understand fully the process of becoming a terrorist, 
“motive cannot be taken in isolation from opportunity.”  Stated simply, 
people follow a pathway into (and often through) radicalization, terrorism 
and terrorist organizations.  The pathway may be different for different 
people and can be affected by a wide range of factors.  Bandura 
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(199063) observed that “the path to terrorism can be shaped by 
fortuitous factors as well as by the conjoint influence of personal 
predilections and social inducements” (p. 186). 
 
The transition into becoming a terrorist is rarely sudden and abrupt.  
“What we know of actual terrorists suggests that there is rarely a 
conscious decision made to become a terrorist.  Most involvement in 
terrorism results from gradual exposure and socialisation towards 
extreme behavior” (Horgan & Taylor, 200164).  Luckabaugh and 
colleagues (199765) view this as one of the few general points of 
agreement in the field of terrorism studies, stating “it is generally 
accepted terrorists do not become terrorists over night.  They follow a 
general progression from social alienation to boredom, then occasional 
dissidence and protest before eventually turning to terrorism.” 
 
McCormick (200366) refers to this as the “developmental” approach , 
which “has been advanced, in various forms, by a wide range of 
commentators (e.g., Knutson 1981; Jenkins 1982; Braungart & 
Braungart 1983, 1989, 1992; Sayari, 1985; Crenshaw1986; Bandura 
1990; Sprinzak 1990, 1991, 1995; Friedland 1992;della Porta 1992, 
1995a,b; Passerini 1992; della Porta & Diani 1999). Terrorism, in this 
view, is not the product of a single decision but the end result of a 
dialectical process that gradually pushes an individual toward a 
commitment to violence over time. The process takes place within a 
larger political environment involving the state, the terrorist group, and 
the group’s self-designated political constituency. The interaction of 
these variables in a group setting is used to explain why individuals turn 
to violence and can eventually justify terrorist actions.” 
 
What is the exact nature and progression of that pathway?  Given the 
wide diversity in motivation, vulnerability and opportunity for terrorism, 
there may be no single pathway or general answer to that would apply 
to all types of groups or to all individuals.  Several efforts have been 
made, however, to articulate a general sequence of stages, events or 
issues that might apply across group types.  The question here is how 
do extremist ideologies develop (radicalization) and ultimately translate 
into justifications or imperatives to use terrroristic violence?   
 
One early model developed by Frederick Hacker (198367) framed the 
progression in three stages.  The first stage involved an awareness of 
oppression.  The second stage marked a recognition that the 
oppression was “social” and therefore not unavoidable.  The third stage 
was an impetus or realization that it was possible to act against the 
oppression.  Ultimately, at the end point of that phase, some conclude 
that working through advocates/ intermediaries (e.g., elected officials) or 
within the system to “reform” or improve it is not going to work and that 
self help by violence is the only effective means for change.   
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Subsequent work by Eric Shaw (198668) explored the existence of  “a 
common developmental pathway by which terrorists enter their 
profession.”   The four stages in that process were as follows:  (1) early 
socialization processes; (2) narcissistic injuries (a critical life event that 
negatively affects self-image or self esteem); (3) escalatory events 
(often a confrontation with police offering a perceived provocation); and 
(4) personal connections to terrorist group members (which enhance 
opportunity, access, and incentives to enter a terrorist group). 
 
Based on an analysis of multiple militant extremist groups with a span of 
diverse ideologies, Borum (200369) observes that there “do appear to be 
some observable markers or stages in the process that are common to 
many individuals in extremist groups and zealous adherents of extremist 
ideologies, both foreign and domestic.  The process begins by framing 
some unsatisfying event or condition as being unjust.  The injustice is 
blamed on a target policy, person, or nation.  The responsible party, 
perceived as a threat, is then vilified – often demonized – which 
facilitates justification for aggression.”    
 
He describes the development of extremist ideas and their justification 
of violence in four simplistically labeled stages:   
 
 It’s not right:  The starting point is a grievance or sense of 
dissatisfaction, usually pertaining to some perceived restriction or 
deprivation in a person’s environment.  The nature of the 
undesirable condition may vary (e.g., economic, social, etc.), but 
those who experience it perceive it in some way as aversive. 
 
 It’s not fair:  An undesirable condition is not necessarily an unjust 
one.  Perceptions of injustice usually arise when one comes to 
view the aversive condition in a comparative context – relative to 
one’s own expectations or relative to how that condition does or 
does not affect others.  This is similar to Ted Gurr’s (196870) 
concept of “relative deprivation,” which he defines as the “actors' 
perception of discrepancy between the value expectations {the 
goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are 
justifiably entitled} and their environment’s apparent value 
capabilities.”  This discrepancy, perceived as unfair or unjust, 
prompts feelings of resentment. 
 
 It’s your fault:  We are socialized to believe that although “bad” 
things may happen in life, injustices typically don’t occur without 
some cause.  Lerner talks about a phenomenon he refers to as 
the “just world hypothesis,” a human condition in which 
"individuals have a need to believe that they live in a world where 
people generally get what they deserve and deserve what they 
get" (Lerner & Miller, 1978, p.103071). If they themselves are the 
victims of injustice, then it is assumed someone else is at fault for 
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that condition.  By attributing blame, those who have 
accumulated resentments now have a target or outlet for them.     
 
 You’re evil:  The stages reviewed so far describe a possible 
mechanism for developing hateful attitudes toward a group or 
institution.  But most people who hate don’t kill.  What facilitates 
violence is the erosion (sometimes intentional) of the 
psychological and social barriers that inhibit aggressive behavior 
even in the presence of aggressive impulse or intent.  This may 
involve creating justifications for one’s actions (such as perceived 
threat and need for “self defense”) and/or dehumanizing the 
victims to some degree, such as by casting them as “evil.”   
                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the model may have some heuristic value, it is not statistically 
derived.  It also appears to account better for violent (militant) 
extremism, than for extremist ideology more generally.  Moreover, it is 
not yet clear how such a progression fits with the stages of becoming, 
remaining, and leaving.   
 
Summary 
  
There is no easy answer or single motivation to explain why people 
become terrorists.  Similarly, the processes and pathways of how that 
happens are quite varied and diverse. Researchers have begun to 
distinguish between reasons for joining, remaining in, and leaving 
terrorist organizations, finding that motivations may be different at each 
stage, and not even necessarily related to each other.  There do appear 
to be some common vulnerabilities and perceptions among those who 
turn to terrorism – perceived injustice, need for identity and need for 
belonging – though certainly there are persons who share these 
perceptions who do not become terrorists.  Promising areas of inquiry 
have focused on common stages and processes in adopting extremist 
ideologies, rather than on the content of the motive or justification, per 
se. 
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To what extent is psychopathology 
relevant for understanding and preventing 
terrorism? 
Psychology, as a discipline, has a long history of (perhaps even a bias 
toward) looking first to explain deviant behaviors as a function of 
psychopathology (i.e., mental disease, disorder, or dysfunction) or 
maladjusted personality syndromes. As Schmid and Jongman (198872) 
noted, “The chief assumption underlying many psychological 
‘theories’…is that the terrorist in one way or the other not normal and 
that the insights from psychology and psychiatry are adequate keys to 
understanding.” In reality, psychopathology has proven to be, at best, 
only a modest risk factor for general violence, and all but irrelevant to 
understanding terrorism.  In fact, “the idea of terrorism as the product of 
mental disorder or psychopathy has been discredited” (Crenshaw, 
199273). 
 
Major Mental Illness 
It is rather difficult to study the prevalence of psychopathology and 
maladaptive personality traits in terrorist populations.  Most studies that 
have examined this question using actual psychological measures have 
included only terrorists that have been captured and/or referred for a 
mental health examination.  Obviously, those viewed as needing a 
mental health assessment may be different from the general terrorist 
population.  Nevertheless, the research that does exist is fairly 
consistent in finding that serious psychopathology or mental illnesses 
among terrorists are relatively rare, and certainly not a major factor in 
understanding or predicting terrorist behavior (McCauley, 200274; 
Sageman, 200475).  For as Fried (198276) has observed, “Even in the 
cases of the terrorist who is clearly psychotic and delusional in his 
thinking, awareness of political realities can play a significant role in 
determining behavior.” 
 
In the opinion of Friedland (199277), “as for empirical support, to date 
there is no compelling evidence that terrorists are abnormal, insane, or 
match a unique personality type.  In fact, there are some indications to 
the contrary.” The two most significant scholarly reviews of the “mental 
disorder” perspective on terrorism are that of Ray Corrado (198178) and 
Andrew Silke (199879).  Although written nearly twenty years apart, both 
reached similar conclusions.  Acknowledging that some studies have 
found psychopathological disorders among some terrorists, Silke 
(199880), summarized his review of the literature with the following 
conclusions:  “The critique finds that the findings supporting the 
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pathology model are rare and generally of poor quality.  In contrast, the 
evidence suggesting terrorist normality is both more plentiful and of 
better quality.”  An even more recent review of the scientific and 
professional literature by Ruby (200281) similarly “concludes that 
terrorist are not dysfunctional or pathological; rather, it suggests that 
terrorism is basically another form of politically motivated violence that is 
perpetrated by rational, lucid people who have valid motives.”   
 
Psychopathy / Antisocial Personality 
Terrorism is regarded by most as a form of antisocial behavior.  Indeed 
to the victims and observers many of the acts could be seen as heinous 
and the actors as callous, “cold blooded killers.”  Given the general 
tendency to view extreme deviance as a sign of abnormality or 
psychopathology, some have posited that terrorists might best be 
understood as a collective of psychopaths (Corrado, 198182).  Certainly 
such concepts were invoked to characterize at least some of the 
hijackers in the 9/11 attacks on America.   
 
It’s not difficult to see how the idea of “terrorist as psychopath” holds 
some intuitive appeal.  Pearce (197783), for example, regarded the 
terrorist as “an aggressive psychopath, who has espoused some 
particular cause because extremist causes can provide an external focal 
point for all the things that have gone wrong in his life.”  To understand 
the limitations and inaccuracies in such a generalization, however, 
requires some examination of the essential elements of psychopathy 
and the way in which those traits interact with the demands of 
participation in a terrorist organization.  First to clarify an issue of 
terminology, the designation of “antisocial personality disorder” (ASPD) 
is a clinically recognized diagnosis characterized by a lifelong history 
(including before age 18) of engaging in a range of delinquent and 
antisocial behaviors, which might include lying, stealing, aggression, 
and criminal activity.  Psychopathy, though widely recognized as a 
clinical syndrome, is not formally listed as a diagnosis in the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders.  Similar to ASPD, the construct of psychopathy includes a 
longstanding pattern of antisocial behavior and impulsive lifestyle, but in 
contrast it also has essential elements deficient emotional experience 
(e.g., lack of guilt, empathy, and remorse) and interpersonal 
exploitativeness (e.g., callous, use of others, parasitic lifestyle).  Only 
about 25% of those with ASPD also have those core personality deficits 
that comprise a psychopathic syndrome84.   
 
In one of the most detailed clinical analyses on the topic, Martens 
(200485) acknowledges that not all terrorists have ASPD (nor are they all 
psychopaths), yet he argues that “individuals who become terrorists 
(TER) (Hudson, 1999) and persons with ASPD (Martens, 1997, 2000) 
share characteristics such as:  social alienation, disturbed early 
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socialization processes, aggressive, action-oriented, stimulus-hungry, 
narcissistic attitude, impulsivity and hostility, suffering from early 
damage to their self-esteem, defensive attitude, primitive defenses as 
shame, fear of dependency, unresolved oedipal issues, omnipotent 
denial, escalatory events, particularly confrontation with police, 
intolerant of criticism, arrogance and disdain, belief of superiority of their 
own belief system, indifference to other people belief systems, hostility, 
lack of self-criticism, justification of their violent behavior, suffering from 
deep trauma, moral disengagement by dehumanizing victims.”  Martens 
(200486) ultimately concludes that terrorists with ASPD should be 
regarded as a discrete group among terrorists (or people with ASPD) 
because they have a constellation of distinctive characteristics.   
On the other hand, it is clear that some core deficits common in 
psychopaths would likely impair their effective functioning in a terrorist 
role.  Cooper (197887) noted long ago “terrorism, like any other serious 
undertaking, requires dedication, perseverance, and a certain 
selflessness.  These are the many qualities that are lacking in the 
psychopath.”  
 
Psychological / Personality Abnormality 
 
In his critical review of the perennial theme of terrorist abnormality in 
psychological research, Andrew Silke(199888) observed that after 
researchers failed to find any strong links between terrorism and major 
psychopathology, “a trend has emerged which asserts that terrorists 
possess many of the traits of pathological personalities but do not 
possess the actual clinical disorders.  This development has effectively 
tainted terrorists with a pathology aura, without offering any way to 
easily test or refute the accusations.”  
 
Despite more than two decades of research and theoretical speculation 
attempting to identify what makes terrorists “different,”  “perhaps the 
best documented generalization is negative: terrorists do not show any 
striking psychopathology” (McCauley, 1989).  In fact, Crenshaw (1981) 
argues that "the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their 
normality" (p. 390), and Silke (199889) has concluded that “most serious 
researchers in the field at least nominally agree with the position that 
terrorists are essentially normal individuals” (p.53). 
 
Suicide Attacks 
While suicide attacks have been a part of conflict throughout the history 
of the world, most contemporary researchers mark the 1983 suicide 
attack on the U.S. embassy in Beirut, as the beginning of a modern era 
of suicide terrorism.  Since that time, “there have been at least 188 
separate suicide terrorist attacks worldwide, in Lebanon, Israel, Sri 
Lanka, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Turkey, Russia, and the 
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United States.  The rate has increased from 31 in the 1980s, to 104 in 
the 1990s, to 53 in 2000-2001 alone” (Pape, 200390). The rate of suicide 
terrorism was rising, even while the overall number of terrorist incidents 
was on the decline.  U.S. Senator John Warner echoed the sentiments 
of many who observed this trend when he said:  “Those who would 
commit suicide in their assaults on the free world are not rational and 
are not deterred by rational concepts.” Available data, however, suggest 
a different conclusion. 
 
Existing research reveals a marked absence of major psychopathology 
among “would-be” suicide attackers; that the motivation and dynamics 
for choosing to engage in a suicide attack differ from those in the clinical 
phenomenon of suicide; and that there is a rational “strategic logic” to 
the use of suicide attack campaigns in asymmetric conflict.   Silke 
(200391) argues that “as with other terrorists, there is no indication that 
suicide bombers suffer from psychological disorders or are mentally 
unbalanced in other ways. In contrast, their personalities are usually 
quite stable and unremarkable (at least within their own cultural 
context)” (p. 94).  Israeli psychology professor Ariel Merari is one of the 
few people in the world to have collected systematic, empirical data on 
a significant sample of suicide bombers.  He examined the backgrounds 
of every modern era (since 1983) suicide bomber in the Middle East.  
Although he expected to find suicidal dynamics and mental pathology, 
instead he found that “In the majority, you find none of the risk factors 
normally associated with suicide, such as mood disorders or 
schizophrenia, substance abuse or history of attempted suicide92.” 
 
In some ways, the absence of suicidal risk factors among suicide 
attackers is not surprising.  They are different phenomena (Borum, 
200393).  Suicide attackers view their act as one of martyrdom, whether 
for their faith, their people, or their cause.  In the case of jihadists, for 
example, “the primary aim of suicide terrorists is not suicide, because to 
the terrorist group, suicide is simply a means to an end with motivation 
that stems from rage and a sense of self-righteousness.  They see 
themselves as having a higher purpose and are convinced of an eternal 
reward through their action” (Salib, 200394).  Borum (200395) articulated 
some of the specific differences in motive, thoughts, feelings, responses 
of others, and pre-incident behaviors that likely distinguish an act of 
suicide from an act of jihadist martyrdom. “People usually associate 
suicide with hopelessness and depression. The desire to end intense 
and unbearable psychological pain typically motivates the actor to 
commit such an act. Others who care for the actor typically view suicide 
as an undesirable outcome. Family and loved ones attempt to 
discourage the behavior and often struggle with feelings of shame if 
suicide does occur. By contrast, people typically associate martyrdom 
with hopefulness about afterlife rewards in paradise and feelings of 
heroic sacrifice. The desire to further the cause of Islam and to answer 
the highest calling in that religion motivates the actor. Others who care 
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for the actor see the pending act as heroic. Family and loved ones 
typically support the behavior, and, if the event occurs, the family is 
honored. Not only does the family of a martyr gain forgiveness of their 
sins in the afterlife but the supporting community often cares for them 
socially and financially.”  Sheikh Yussuf Al-Qaradhawi, a spiritual leader 
of the Muslim Brotherhood draws the distinction succinctly as follows:  
“He who commits suicide kills himself for his own benefit, he who 
commits martyrdom sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion and his 
nation.... The Mujahed is full of hope” (Cited in Atran, 200396).   
 
Suicide terrorism also is not exclusively a tactic of the religious 
extremist.  Sprinzak (200197) points out that “the Black Tigers 
{Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam -LTTE} constitute the most 
significance proof that suicide terrorism is not merely a religious 
phenomenon and that under certain extreme political and psychological 
circumstances secular volunteers are fully capable of martyrdom.”  In 
fact, that group alone is responsible for nearly half of the suicide attacks 
worldwide that have occurred in the past decade (Pape, 2003).   
 
If suicide attacks are not driven by mental illness or religious fanaticism, 
what accounts for its persistent and increasing use?  Certainly there are 
logistical and tactical advantages:  the operations are relatively 
inexpensive, the attackers are unlikely to be captured and compromise 
the security of the group; and the psychological effects on the target 
population can be devastating.  Moreover, this tactic has shown 
disproportionate lethality.  Even excluding the 9/11 attacks on America, 
in the span of two decades between 1980 and 2001, suicide attacks 
accounted for only 3% of all terrorist incidents, but they were 
responsible for 48% of the terrorism-related deaths (Department of 
State 1983-200198).  However, Pape (200399) suggests that “the main 
reason that suicide terrorism is growing is that terrorists have learned 
that it works….Perhaps the most striking aspect of recent suicide 
terrorist campaigns is that they are associated with gains for the 
terrorists’ political cause about half the time. …the timing of six of the 11 
suicide terrorist campaigns {since 1980}  correlate with significant policy 
changes by the target state toward the terrorists’ major political goals.”    
 
Summary 
 
Research on the psychology of terrorism has been nearly unanimous in 
its conclusion that mental illness and abnormality are typically not 
critical factors in terrorist behavior.  Studies have found that the 
prevalence of mental illness among samples of  incarcerated terrorists 
is as low or lower than in the general population.  Moreover, although 
terrorists often commit heinous acts, they would rarely be considered 
classic “psychopaths.”  Terrorists typically have some connection to 
principles or ideology as well as to other people (including other 
terrorists) who share them.  Psychopaths, however, do not form such 
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connections, nor would they be likely to sacrifice themselves (including 
dying) for a cause. 
 
To what extent is individual personality 
relevant for understanding and preventing 
terrorism? 
Person vs. Situation Emphasis in Explaining 
Behavior 
 
Personality traits consistently have failed to explain most types of 
human behaviors, including violent behaviors.  Certainly they have been 
shown repeatedly to contribute less to an explanation than situational 
and contextual factors.  Crenshaw (2001100), for example, has argued 
that “shared ideological commitment and group solidarity are much 
more important determinants of terrorist behavior than individual 
characteristics.”   Bandura seems to agree, as reflected in his more 
general conclusion that “It requires conducive social conditions rather 
than monstrous people to produce heinous deeds."   
 
The most effective method for explaining behavior, however, is by 
combining personal and situational factors.  Past analyses of acts of 
targeted violence reveal that the “person”- related factors are only one 
part of the equation, and often not the most critical.  Risk for engaging in 
terrorism is the product of factors related not only to the individual, but 
also to the situation, setting, and potential target (Borum, et al., 1999101; 
Fein & Vossekuil, 1998102).  Contextual factors such as the support or 
rejection of friends and family to the extremist ideology or justifications 
for violence, the degree of security or target hardening that exists, the 
recency or severity of experiences that might exacerbate hostility toward 
the target all could affect the nature and degree of risk posed by a 
person of investigative concern. 
 
The Terrorist Personality 
 
Although the possible existence of a “terrorist personality” holds some 
intuitive appeal, it most certainly is devoid of empirical support.  “Even 
the briefest review of the history of terrorism reveals how varied and 
complex a phenomenon it is, and therefore how futile it is to attribute 
simple, global, and general psychological characteristics to all 
terrorists.” (Reich,1990103, p. 263). Further complicating this effort is the 
fact that terrorists can assume many different roles – only a few will 
actually fire the weapon or detonate the bomb. The “personality” of a 
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financier, may be different from that of an administrator or strategist or 
an assassin.  Taylor and Quayle’s research (1994104) explored whether 
some systematic differences might be discerned between those who 
engage in terrorism and those who do not; yet their search led them to 
the conclusion that “the active terrorist is not discernibly different in 
psychological terms from the non-terrorist; in psychological terms, there 
are no special qualities that characterize the terrorist.” 
 
Nearly a decade later, psychologist John Horgan (2003105) again 
examined the cumulative research evidence on the search for a terrorist 
personality, and concluded that “in the context of a scientific study of 
behaviour (which implies at least a sense of rigour) such attempts to 
assert the presence of a terrorist personality, or profile, are pitiful.”  This 
appears to be a conclusion of consensus among most researchers who 
study terrorist behavior.  “With a number of exceptions (e.g., Feuer 
1969), most observers agree that although latent personality traits can 
certainly contribute to the decision to turn to violence, there is no single 
set of psychic attributes that explains terrorist behavior”  (McCormick, 
2003106).  Nevertheless, Marsella (2003107) is still hopeful that “early 
classical psychological studies of authoritarianism, dogmatism, 
tolerance of ambiguity, prejudice, trust, alienation, conformity, and other 
personal predisposition and inclinations can still provide a firm 
conceptual and empirical foundation for contemporary efforts.” 
 
The Terrorist Profile 
 
The term and concept of “profiling” has come to have many different 
meanings.  In the context of the following discussion, the term “profiling” 
is not used to refer to the type of criminal investigative analysis that was 
refined by members of the FBI’s Behavioral Science Unit.  That kind of 
investigative profiling seeks to examine physical and behavioral 
evidence of an offense after it has occurred and, based on that 
information, draw inferences about potential characteristics of the 
person who committed the crime.   Counterterrorism intelligence, 
however, is primarily concerned with the identification and interruption of 
terrorist activity before an attack occurs.  This poses a very different 
kind of operational challenge.   
 
Some have assumed by examining characteristics of people who have 
committed terrorist acts in the past (particularly if the number was large 
enough), it should be possible to delineate a demographic/ 
psychological composite of common traits that could be used to spot a 
terrorist in an otherwise murky haystack of law-abiding citizens108.  A 
number of social science researchers have attempted to develop such a 
composite.  In fact, Horgan and Taylor (2001109) suggest  “a popular 
approach to terrorism by academia has been to attempt to profile 
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Russell & Miller Profile 
 
AGE:  Generally 22-25 for members  
SEX:  80% of operations led and directed by males
MARITAL STATUS:  Most unmarried 
URBAN/RURAL:  “Most urban terrorists are 
natives or long-time residents of metropolitan areas,”
SOCIOECONOMIC:  Predominantly middle and 
upper class for members and leaders.   
EDUCATION:  Two thirds had at least some 
university training.   
RECRUITMENT SITE:  Large universities are the 
primary sites.  
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: The three tendencies 
at play in terrorist organizations at the time were 
anarchism, Marxism-Leninism, and nationalism.   
terrorists, wither in psychological sense or across socio-political 
dimensions.” 
 
One of the best known, most comprehensive, and most often cited of 
these efforts is a profile 
developed by Russell and 
Miller (1977110) based on a 
compilation of published 
data regarding over 350 
individual terrorist cadres 
and leaders across 18 
different Palestinian, 
Japanese, German, Italian, 
Turkish, Irish, Spanish, 
Iranian, Argentina, Brazilian, 
and Uruguayan terrorist 
groups active during the 
1966-1976 time span. The 
prototype derived from their 
composite described a 
young (22-25), unmarried 
male who is an urban resident, from a middle-upper class family, has 
some university education and probably held an extremist political 
philosophy.  
 
Even the briefest reflection should reveal the problem that most 
individuals who fit that general description are not terrorists and will 
never commit an act of terrorist aggression.  The problem of equally 
grave significance that could result from its use, however, is that that 
there are and will be people who are planning and preparing to mount a 
terrorist attack, who do not fit that profile (Borum, et al, 2003111).  Silke 
warns “the belief that profiling can provide an effective defence also 
seriously underestimates the intelligence of terrorist organisations” 
(Silke, 2003112). Indeed, sophisticated terrorist groups, such as al 
Qa’ida, actively seek to know the “type” of person who will attract 
suspicion and then scout and use operators who defy that 
preconception.   Al-Qa’ida expert, Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, has 
documented that the organization recruits members from 74 different 
countries and among at least 40 different nationalities113. If the profile is 
the gatekeeper of who poses a threat, defenders will be soundly 
defeated by a known, but unfamiliar-looking enemy.   
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Summary 
 
There is no terrorist personality, nor is there any accurate profile – 
psychologically or otherwise – of the terrorist.   Moreover, personality 
traits alone tend not to be very good predictors of behavior.  The quest  
to understand terrorism by studying terrorist personality traits is likely to 
be an unproductive area for further investigation and inquiry. 
 
To what extent are an individual’s life 
experiences relevant for understanding 
and preventing terrorism? 
Childhood & Adult Experiences  
 
Just as there is no single terrorist personality or profile, a specific 
constellation of life experiences is neither necessary nor sufficient to 
cause terrorism.  The role of life experiences in understanding a 
pathway to terrorism is based mainly on certain emotional and 
behavioral themes; in the contemporary literature three experiential 
themes appear to be robust:  Injustice, Abuse, and Humiliation.  They 
often are so closely connected that it is difficult to separate the effects 
and contributions of each.  By definition, most abuse is unjust.  
Humiliation often results from extreme forms of abuse (often involving 
the anticipated judgments of others).  Moreover, those experiences may 
have different effects when they present in different forms (e.g. parental 
abuse vs. prison abuse) or at different points in one’s development 
(e.g., during childhood vs. during adulthood).   
 
Field (1979114) spent more than eight years studying terrorism and the 
“troubles” in Northern Ireland, where she found “the children there have 
suffered severe disruption in the development of moral judgment-a 
cognitive function-and are obsessed with death and destruction about 
which the feel helpless, and against which they feel isolated and 
hopeless.”  She apparently was not surprised by the findings: “common 
sense and experience can tell us that people who are badly treated, 
and/or unjustly punished, will seek revenge.  It should be not be 
surprising, then, that young adolescents, who have themselves been 
terrorized, become terrorists, and that in a situation where they are 
afforded social supports by their compatriots reacting against the 
actions of an unjust government, the resort to terrorist tactics becomes 
a way of life” (Field, 1979115).   
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Twenty years later, some in the psychiatric community continue to share 
this view.  Akhtar (1999116) concludes that “evidence does exist that 
most major players in a terrorist organization are themselves, deeply 
traumatized individuals.  As children, they suffered chronic physical 
abuse, and profound emotional humiliation.  They grew up mistrusting 
others, loathing passivity, and dreading reoccurrence of a violation of 
their psychophysical boundaries.”  The nature and strength of the 
evidence to which she refers, however, is less clear.   
 
Many researchers and terrorist case histories have noted that periods of 
imprisonment and incarceration often facilitated experiences of injustice, 
abuse and humiliation (Ferracuti & Bruno,1981117, della Porta, 1992118).  
Post and colleagues (2003119) offer a rich account of the impact of such 
experiences among the 35 incarcerated middle-eastern terrorists whom 
they interviewed.  They found that “the prison experience was intense, 
especially for the Islamist terrorists. It further consolidated their identity 
in the group or organizational membership that provided the most 
valued element of personal identity. The impact of the prison experience 
showed more divergence between the secular and Islamist groups. Only 
a small percentage of either group stated that they were less connected 
to the group after their incarceration. Sixty two per cent of secular group 
members reported returning to activity with their organization, compared 
to 84 per cent of the Islamist group members who returned or plan to 
return upon their release. The prison experience also reinforced 
negative perceptions of Israelis and Israeli security forces.” (Post, 
Sprinzak, & Denny, 2003120).  
 
Taken together, these findings regarding childhood trauma and adult 
injustice and humiliation, even if they are accurate and generalize to 
most or all terrorists, do not themselves contribute much to a causal 
explanation of terrorism.  Many terrorists are involved in extremist 
groups before their incarceration and certainly we know that more 
people have personal histories of having been abused and humiliated 
than become terrorists.  Nevertheless, some of these life experiences 
may be seen as markers of vulnerability, as possible sources of 
motivation, or as mechanisms for acquiring or hardening one’s militant 
ideology.   
 
Finally, twenty years ago, Fried (1982121) posed the dilemma as follows:  
“We are left to ponder what events may be the ones that make a 
potential terrorist cross the line into actual violence, or possibly even 
lean to terrorist activity on the part of someone whom one would not 
have described as particularly terrorism-prone.  Such factors may 
include experiences of profound disappointment because of a personal 
failure or disillusionment with an ideal; the killing or imprisonment of a 
family member or comrade; being introduced into a setting where 
terrorism is a long-standing tradition or a response to current political 
crisis; or contact with a group that influences the way in which one 
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cognitively restructures and reevaluates the political situation, with 
membership in that group being something that meets personal needs 
and participation in terrorist activities merely one of the conditions one 
has to fulfill for membership.”    
 
Summary 
  
Certain life experiences tend to be commonly found among terrorists.  
Histories of childhood abuse and trauma appear to be widespread. In 
addition, themes of perceived injustice and humiliation often are 
prominent in terrorist biographies and personal histories.  None of these 
contribute much to a causal explanation of terrorism, but may be seen 
as markers of vulnerability, as possible sources of motivation, or as 
mechanisms for acquiring or hardening one’s militant ideology.   
 
What is the role of ideology in terrorist 
behavior? 
Ideology plays a crucial role in terrorist's target selection; it supplies terrorists 
with an initial motive for action and provides a prism through which they view 
events and the actions of other people (Drake, 1998). 
 
What Is Ideology? 
 
The term “ideology” often carries a negative connotation.   In reality, 
however, the term is functionally neutral, and, broadly conceived, 
applies to many.  Ideology is often defined as a common and broadly 
agreed upon set of rules to which an individual subscribes, which help 
to regulate and determine behavior (Rokeach, 1979122; Taylor,1991123).  
These “rules” are, of course, also linked to (perhaps even guided by) 
one’s beliefs, values, principles, and goals (Drake, 1998124).  The 
difference and relationship between an ideology and a worldview may 
depend on one’s perspective - perhaps a worldview  is broader or just 
less overt – nonetheless they serve a similar function of acting not only 
to provide guidelines for behavior, but also as a lens through which we 
perceive and interpret information, cues, and events in our environment 
(Mack, 2002125).  Many religions either embrace or sustain an ideology.  
The doctrine or core beliefs are certainly a central element of a religious 
system, but those beliefs generally are at least implicitly tied to a set of 
“rules,” which would comprise an ideology. 
 
The substance of ideologies among individuals and groups probably 
extend through the entire range of human interest and values.  There 
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do, however, appear to be some commonalities in the process or 
structure of terrorist ideologies that may help inform an understanding of 
terrorist behavior.   Aaron Beck (2002126) recently applied a cognitive 
model to terrorist ideologies and concluded that “the thinking of the 
terrorist evidently shows the same kind of cognitive distortions observed 
in others who engage in violent acts, either solely as individuals or as 
members of a group. These include overgeneralization that is, the 
supposed sins of the enemy may spread to encompass the entire 
population. Also, they show dichotomous thinking that a people are 
either totally good or totally bad. Finally, they demonstrate tunnel vision 
once they are engaged in their holy mission (e.g., jihad), their thinking, 
and consequently their actions, focuses exclusively on the destruction of 
the target.” 
 
Taking a slightly broader view, based on examination of the existing 
professional literature and consideration of a variety of extremist 
ideologies, I suggest that three general conditions seem necessary for 
an ideology to support terrorism. 
 
First, the ideology must provide a set of beliefs that guide and justify a 
series of behavioral mandates.  Bandura argues that "people do not 
ordinarily engage in reprehensible conduct until they have justified to 
themselves the morality of their actions.”  Terrorists, like most others, 
seek to avoid internal conflict or dissonance by acting in ways that are 
consistent with their own beliefs and that allow them to see themselves 
as basically good.  In essence, “terrorists must develop justifications for 
their terrorist actions” (Cooper, 1977127).   
 
Second, those beliefs must be inviolable and must be neither 
questionable nor questioned.  “In his classic volume, The True Believer 
(1951128), Eric Hoffer pointed out the importance of belief for the human 
mind and the problems that arise when uncertainty in belief cannot be 
tolerated.  Belief provides meaning and purpose-it reduces uncertainty 
and facilitates adaptation and adjustment.  It offers "deep assurance" 
and "communion" with others.  Of special significance in this syndrome 
is the inability to tolerate doubt and uncertainty” (Marsella, 2003129).  
The beliefs on which the terrorist ideology is based cannot be doubted, 
criticized or skeptically examined.  Indeed, among those who subscribe 
to the ideology, “to rely on the evidence of the senses and of reason is 
heresy and treason. It is startling to realize how much unbelief is 
necessary to make belief possible” (Hoffer, 1951, p.83).    Keane 
(2001130) has similarly noted that  “for terrorism to succeed it demands 
firstly a rigid adherence to a simple idea.  The mind that questions, 
debates, opens itself to challenging ideas, will prove a source of division 
for a terrorist movement in the heat of battle. Sticking to a rigid 
orthodoxy offers security and justification to people committing acts of 
terror”. 
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Third, the behaviors must be goal directed and seen as serving some 
meaningful cause or objective.  People strive for meaning, and perhaps 
no cause has greater meaning than the polemic struggle between good 
and evil, in its various forms (McCormick, 2003131).  Evidence of this 
dynamic figures prominently into most terrorist ideologies.  Falk 
(1988132) even suggests that "the terrorist mindset is dominated by its 
melodramatic preoccupation with the destruction of evil.”  Kernberg133 
argues that such dichotomous, absolutist, “black and white” thinking, 
especially concerning matters of morality, is a common feature of 
fundamentalist ideologies in general.  He has observed that such 
ideologies, “divide the world into ideal and evil realms; their own 
ideology belongs to the ideal realm. The ideas beliefs and behavior of 
the realm of evil are immoral, dangerous, destructive, and threatening.  
Typically, such an ideology projects all aggression on to the evil social 
group, while justifying aggression against the infidel as a necessary 
defense and retribution if not a moral imperative” (Kernberg, 2003).  
Many analysts have commented on how this polarized moral polemic 
provides fertile ground for prescriptions of violence (Baumeister, 
1997134; Post, 1987135; Schorkopf, 2003136;  White, 2001137). 
 
How Does Culture Affect Ideology? 
 
The role and influence of culture on terrorism generally and on terrorist 
ideologies specifically has been virtually neglected by most social 
science researchers.  Brannan and colleagues have stated the problem 
quite clearly:  “There is one fundamental issue relevant to such 
understanding that is rarely mentioned in terrorism studies and yet the 
virtual absence of which is an unambiguous sign of the flawed 
methodology currently in vogue.  This is the issue of culture”  (Brannan 
et al., 2001138, p. 14). 
 
There are many definitions of culture139.  Surely as much has been 
written about defining culture as has been written on defining terrorism 
itself.  At the most general, anthropological level, culture is often defined 
as “socially patterned human thought and behavior.”  In the context of 
understanding its potential impact on terrorist ideologies, however, our 
primary interest is in  “the immaterial or social dimensions of culture, 
that is, the unique collection of social roles, institutions, values, ideas, 
and symbols operative in every group, which radically conditions the 
way in which members see the world and respond to its challenges”  
(Brannan, et al., 2001140 p. 15). 
 
Even early on in the study of terrorism, there was some recognition 
(although little analysis) of the fact that one’s social environment could 
impact the development of beliefs and values, but this would not provide 
a complete and satisfactory explanation for the phenomenon.  Eric 
Shaw (1986141), in crafting his developmental pathway model, 
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recognized the potentially significant role of early socialization 
experiences as part of a complex of influences that might predispose an 
individual to move along a path to terrorism.   
 
Knutson (1981142) observed  “from the life histories available for 
terrorists (see especially Morf ,1970), it is clear that these individuals 
are acting upon values into which they have been comfortably 
socialized- both directly by teaching, and indirectly by life experiences of 
themselves and important others.  However, these social-cultural-
political values which are sanguine to a revolutionary terrorist identity 
are a necessary but not sufficient ingredient in the formation of the 
terrorist.”  
 
Certainly, it is not difficult to see how some early life experiences, 
socialization or exposure to a particular environment might shape one’s 
general worldview in a variety of ways.   More subtly, though than the 
milieu or exposure to experiences of modeling or vicarious learning, is 
the fact that different cultures tend to have their own personalities that 
influence development.  Of course, any statement that characteristics a 
culture, can also be a generalization about individuals within that 
culture.  Every element will not apply equally to everyone.  As noted 
above, a more complete understanding of human behavior is achieved 
by examining factors related both to the person and to the situation.  
Cultural influences arguably contain a measure of both. 
 
One popular example of a dimensional approach to characterizing 
cultures is found in the work of Dutch psychologist Geert Hofstede, 
drawing from research that formed the basis for his book:: Culture’s 
Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and 
Organizations Across Nations143.  Subsequent adaptations have been 
used (and widely debated144) within the international business 
community.  His model is based on a series of five factors that are often 
referred to as “Hofstede’s Dimensions: 
 
 Power Distance: focuses on the degree of equality, or 
inequality, between people in the country's society. 
 Individualism: focuses on the degree the society reinforces 
individual or collective achievement and interpersonal 
relationships. 
 Masculinity: focuses on the degree the society reinforces, or 
does not reinforce, the traditional masculine work role model of 
male achievement, control, and power. 
 Uncertainty Avoidance: focuses on the level of tolerance for 
uncertainty and ambiguity within the society - i.e. unstructured 
situations. 
 Long-Term Orientation:  focuses on the degree the society 
embraces, or does not embrace, long-term devotion to 
traditional, forward thinking values.145 
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These dimensions have been applied to a variety of cultures, countries 
and religions by assigning “scores”, permitting them to be compared to 
one another.  For example, the following analysis is offered for the Arab 
World:   
 
“The Geert Hofstede analysis for the Arab World, that includes the countries 
of Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab 
Emirates, demonstrates the Muslim faith plays a significant role in the 
people’s lives. 
  
Large Power Distance (PDI) (80) and Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI) (68) are 
predominant Hofstede Dimension characteristics for the countries in this 
region. These societies are more likely to follow a caste system that does 
not allow significant upward mobility of its citizens. They are also highly rule-
oriented with laws, rules, regulations, and controls in order to reduce the 
amount of uncertainty, while inequalities of power and wealth have been 
allowed to grow within the society. 
  
When these two Dimensions are combined, it creates a situation where 
leaders have virtually ultimate power and authority, and the rules, laws and 
regulations developed by those in power reinforce their own leadership and 
control. It is not unusual for new leadership to arise from armed insurrection 
– the ultimate power, rather than from diplomatic or democratic change. 
  
The high Power Distance (PDI) ranking is indicative of a high level of 
inequality of power and wealth within the society. These populations have 
an expectation and acceptance that leaders will separate themselves from 
the group and this condition is not necessarily subverted upon the 
population, but rather accepted by the society as their cultural heritage. 
  
The high Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI) ranking of 68, indicates the 
society’s low level of tolerance for uncertainty. In an effort to minimize or 
reduce this level of uncertainty, strict rules, laws, policies, and regulations 
are adopted and implemented. The ultimate goal of these populations is to 
control everything in order to eliminate or avoid the unexpected. As a result 
of this high Uncertainty Avoidance characteristic, the society does not 
readily accept change and is very risk adverse. 
 
The Masculinity index (MAS), the third highest Hofstede Dimension is 52, 
only slightly higher than the 50.2 average for all the countries included in the 
Hofstede MAS Dimension. This would indicate that while women in the Arab 
World are limited in their rights, it may be due more to Muslim religion rather 
than a cultural paradigm. 
  
The lowest Hofstede Dimension for the Arab World is the Individualism 
(IDV) ranking at 38, compared to a world average ranking of 64. This 
translates into a Collectivist society as compared to Individualist culture and 
is manifested in a close long-term commitment to the member 'group', that 
being a family, extended family, or extended relationships. Loyalty in a 
collectivist culture is paramount, and over-rides most other societal rules. 
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The predominant religion for these countries is Islam, the practice of the 
Muslim faith.  There is a high correlation between the Muslim religion and 
the Hofstede Dimensions of Power Distance (PDI) and Uncertainty 
Avoidance (UAI) scores. 
 
The combination of these two high scores (UAI) and (PDI) create societies 
that are highly rule-oriented with laws, rules, regulations, and controls in 
order to reduce the amount of uncertainty, while inequalities of power and 
wealth have been allowed to grow within the society. These cultures are 
more likely to follow a caste system that does not allow significant upward 
mobility of its citizens. 
  
When these two Dimensions are combined, it creates a situation where 
leaders have virtually ultimate power and authority, and the rules, laws and 
regulations developed by those in power, reinforce their own leadership and 
control. It is not unusual for new leadership to arise from armed insurrection 
– the ultimate power, rather than from diplomatic or democratic change.” 
 
How Does Ideology Affect Behavior? 
 
In itself, ideology is not enough to convince a person to engage in terrorism.   
Merari, 2000 
 
Ideologies generally are based on a set of shared beliefs that explain 
and justify a set of agreed upon behavioral rules.  For terrorists, 
ideology helps to provide “the moral and political vision that inspires 
their violence, shapes the way in which they see the world, and defines 
how they judge the actions of people and institutions” (Drake, 1998146).  
To state simply that ideology controls actions (which may generally be 
true), however, does not explain why or how that control occurs.  This is 
a relevant consideration because it is the strength of behavioral control 
– not just the appeal of the rhetoric - that determines whether violent 
mandates will be followed.  Taylor has provided perhaps the clearest 
behavioral explanation:  “the way ideology controls behavior is by 
providing a set of contingencies that link immediate behavior (e.g., 
violence) to distant outcomes (e.g., new state, afterlife reward147).”  
Because the connection is distant, however, to exert any effect, the 
contingency must be absolutely certain (hence the need for 
unquestioning acceptance).  In addition, the outcomes or rewards need 
to be powerful motivators or reinforcers.  That is, they need to be 
fervently desired.   
 
The alternative - albeit related - framework for analysis of control is to 
consider ideologically-driven action as a form of rule-following behavior.  
A rule can be conceptualized as “a verbal description of relationships 
between behaviors and consequences, especially aversive events and 
reinforcement” (Taylor & Horgan, 2001148).  At this juncture, it is relevant 
to examine whether and the extent to which religion – particularly 
compared to secular based ideologies – affects the nature and degree 
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of ideological control over behavior.  Religious extremists are called to 
participate in the religion and to follow the rules.  The professional 
literature suggests the following about this kind of compliance.  Three 
factors appear to exert primary influence in maintaining religious 
participation: 
  
1. Hearing that one's existing practice will produce spiritual as well 
as materialistic reinforcers. 
 
2. No longer hearing that one’s current practices are producing 
negative sanctions. 
 
3. Hearing that our enemies are in supernatural trouble. 
 
 
In contrast, compliance with religious rules appears to be maintained 
only by "escape contingency,"- the prospect of reducing or eliminating 
the feelings of guilt or fear the religion has caused the noncompliance to 
evoke (Mallot, 1988149). 
 
Ideologies – especially religious ones - may also contain mandates or 
imperatives that impel its adherents to action.  Two types of mandates 
are particularly noteworthy:  the moral mandate and the divine mandate. 
Skitka and Mullen (2002150) define moral mandates “as the specific 
attitude positions or stands that people develop out of a moral 
conviction that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral.  Moral 
mandates share the same characteristics of other strong attitudes-that 
is, extremity, importance and certainty-but have an added motivational 
and action component, because they are imbued with moral conviction.”   
The divine mandate is one of the unique - and potentially most 
concerning – features of the extremist driven by religious ideology. As 
characterized by Rapoport (1984151), “the transcendent source of holy 
terror is its most critical distinguishing characteristic; the deity is 
perceived as being directly involved in the determination of ends and 
means.”  In her extensive study of 250 Palestinian terrorists and 
recruiters, Nasra Hassan noted that all of them believed that their 
actions were “sanctioned by the divinely revealed religion of Islam.” 
 
Finally, in an analysis of the connection between ideology and violent 
action, Taylor (1991152) posited a combination of three key factors as 
having particular importance:   
 
1. Militant potential  - (i.e., whether violence is legitimized in the 
ideology as a means to an end);  
 
2. Totality of the ideology  - (i.e., extent to which the ideology 
controls all behavior, not just specific religious or political 
elements); and 
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3. Perceived imminence in millenarian achievement 
  
Summary 
  
Ideology is often defined as a common and broadly agreed upon set of 
rules to which an individual subscribes, which help to regulate and 
determine behavior.  Ideologies that support terrorism, while quite 
diverse, appear to have three common structural characteristics:  they 
must provide a set of beliefs that guide and justify a series of behavioral 
mandates; those beliefs must be inviolable and must be neither 
questionable nor questioned; and the behaviors must be goal directed 
and seen as serving some cause or meaningful objective.  Culture is a 
critical factor in the development of ideology, but its impact on terrorist 
ideologies specifically, has not been studied.  Ideology guides and 
controls behavior perhaps by providing a set of behavioral 
contingencies that link immediate behavior and actions to positive 
outcomes and rewards down the road, or it may best be viewed as a 
form of rule-following behavior. 
 
What distinguishes extremists who act 
violently from those who do not? 
“The question is not whether we will be extremists, but what kind of extremists 
we will be.”   
Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.  
 
Extremist vs. Terrorist 
 
Nearly all terrorists are extremists, but most extremists are not terrorists.    
By definition an extremist is simply one who deviates from the norm, 
especially in politics.  Extremism is ubiquitous among various nations 
and cultures.  While it may be helpful and instructive to examine the 
factors that facilitate or inhibit extremist ideologies in general, it is the 
extremists who advocate and use violence and terrorist tactics that pose 
the greatest concern. 
 
In the prior section, we argued ideologies that support terrorism appear 
to have three common structural characteristics:  they must provide a 
set of beliefs that guide and justify a series of behavioral mandates; 
those beliefs must be inviolable and must be neither questionable nor 
questioned; and the behaviors must be goal directed and seen as 
serving some cause or meaningful objective.  A further relevant 
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distinction among extremists and between extremist groups is, what I 
will refer to here as, “direction of activity.”  The basic dimension of 
interest is whether the focus is more on promotion of the “cause” or 
destruction of those who oppose it.   A promotion orientation is more 
inwardly focused.  The goals that drive behavior are creation and 
attainment of some desired outcome.  A destruction orientation is more 
outwardly focused (i.e., the enemy or “other”).  The goals that drive 
behavior are annihilation of non-believers and those who oppose its 
interests and values.   
 
Even among subscribers to a destruction-oriented ideology, not all will 
personally engage in acts of extremist violence or become terrorists.  
They do, however, contribute to the terrorists’ success.  As applied to 
anti-American jihadists, Keane (2001153) makes the following 
observation:  “Most of the people who demonize American and Western 
values will not become terrorist supporters, but a crucial minority will 
take further steps, out of community of acceptance and into that of 
involvement.  They may become active terrorists, they could end up 
providing funding and safe houses, or they will provide a vocal moral 
constituency that enables the likes of bin Laden to claim (however 
erroneously) to be acting for the oppressed of the Islamic world.  So it 
would be wrong to interpret the case of Al-Qaida as an isolated 
psychological phenomenon.  What differs is the scale of their atrocity 
and the use of violence as a 'hold' end in itself.”  
 
How do people come to see violence as a legitimate means or even an 
end in itself? 
 
Breaking Down Barriers to Violent Action 
 
It is a puzzling question to ponder why some people kill, but it is equally 
curious to reflect on why more people don’t.  Certainly more people 
think about it or “wish” they could do it, than actually commit murder.  
The too-simple answer to this quandary is that there are certain 
psychological and social barriers in constant operation that serve to 
inhibit impulses of lethal aggression.  Retired Lieutenant Colonel David 
Grossman in his thoughtful book “On Killing154” even goes so far as to 
argue that there is an innate or instinctual taboo against intra-species 
killing.   Regardless of the source, these barriers are not invulnerable.  
They can be weakened, or broken down to facilitate attainment of a 
lethal objective.  It is possible to conceptualize two main avenues of 
assault on those barriers:  Outside-In (i.e., effects of the group or social 
environment) and Inside-Out (i.e., making an internal cognitive 
adjustment about how to perceive the environment or situation).  As 
they operate in the real world, of course, the lines of demarcation 
between these bulldozers of constraint is not nearly so clear.  Person 
and situational influences reciprocally affect the other.   
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Outside-In (Group Effects) 
 
Diffusion of Responsibility:  One of the psychological barriers to violent 
action is anticipating a negative self-evaluation.  This can be weakened 
by mitigating one’s perceived culpability.  Social psychological research 
suggests that people feel less responsible (or less culpable) when, 
either in the presence of, or on behalf of a group, they engage in 
transgressive behavior (or fail to engage in helping behavior).  This 
phenomenon, labeled diffusion of responsibility, has been studied 
primarily in relation to bystander apathy and failures to act to help 
others155.  This effect is similar to, but distinguishable from displacement 
of responsibility, where the actor mitigates his own culpability by noting 
that he committed the act under an order mandate from some authority.  
In such displacement, the actor attempts to absolve himself of intent 
because he is acting under orders.  The superior attempts to absolve 
himself of involvements in the act because he merely issues a directive.  
Some of the same forces that Nazi soldiers attempted (unsuccessfully) 
to invoke as a defense for their war crimes, also operate within 
extremist and terrorist organizations.   
 
Deindividuation:   A not dissimilar social psychological process is known 
as deindividuation.  According to classic deindividuation theory, when 
"individuals are not seen or paid attention to as individuals156" (p. 382), 
they lose their sense of self-awareness and consequently their 
inhibitions and restraints.  The resulting condition is referred to as a 
“deindividuated state.”  This was the theory invoked to explain the 
behavior of student “guards” who participated in Phil Zimbardo’s now 
famous Stanford Prison Experiment157.  Factors such as anonymity, 
group presence, and physical arousal were hypothesized to facilitate a 
deindividuated state (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1982158; Silke, 2003159).  
Subsequent research, however, - including a meta-analysis of studies 
on the phenomenon – suggest that the observed disinhibited behavior 
may be better explained as a reaction of conformity to situation-specific 
norms, instead of by a fundamental change in one’s psychological state 
that produces nonconformity to general social norms160.  
 
Obedience:  We noted above that displacement of responsibility can 
occur in response to directions given from someone in a position of 
authority. The mechanism of obedience is that the actor, transfers his 
moral agency from self to the authority.  Perhaps the best known 
research on this phenomenon is Stanley Milgram’s (1983161) study in 
the 1960s in which students believed they were administering electrical 
shocks to other student participants.  They continued to “increase” the 
shock intensity as instructed by the experimenter, even to levels they 
believed to be harmful or dangerous.  The basic findings have been 
replicated by other researchers in other countries and cultures.  Milgram 
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(1965162) noted that “a substantial proportion of people do what they are 
told to do, irrespective of the content of the act and without limitations of 
conscience, so long as they perceive that the command comes from a 
legitimate authority.” 
 
Social Identity:  If contemporary findings on the phenomenon of 
deindividuation are correct- that it is a behavioral response to situation-
specific norms - then it offers support for Tajfel's (1982163) social identity 
theory.  “Tajfel's theory suggests that we tend to structure our social 
environments in terms of groupings of persons, or social categories, 
thus simplifying the world we live in.  These categories are to some 
extent based upon our own experiences but also largely determined by 
our society.  Our knowledge of our own membership in various of these 
social categories is defined as our social identity and forms an important 
part of our self-concept.  To enhance our social identity, we tend to 
behave in ways that make our own group acquire positive 
distinctiveness in comparison to other groups.  If this is not possible we 
may seek to change our group membership; or if this is not possible, we 
may attempt a redefinition of the existing social situation so as to 
achieve a more positive social identity” (Cairns, 1987164).  The 
implication is that group norms will define what is appropriate in a given 
situation.  In this way, the norms of the group can offset or weaken an 
individual’s barriers to non-normative or antisocial action.  Reflecting on 
their interviews with middle eastern terrorists, Post and colleagues 
(2003165) conclude “as the individual and group fuse, the more personal 
the struggle becomes for the group members. An overarching sense of 
the collective consumes the individual. This fusion with the group seems 
to provide the necessary justification for their actions with an attendant 
loss of felt responsibility for the individual member.” 
 
Inside-Out (Cognitive Readjustment) 
  
Albert Bandura (2004166) argues persuasively that “self sanctions play a 
role in the regulation of inhumane conduct.  In the course of 
socialization, people adopt moral standards that serve as guides and 
deterrents for conduct.  After personal control has developed, people 
regulate their actions by the sanctions they apply to themselves.  They 
do things that give them self satisfaction and a sense of self-worth.  
They refrain from behaving in ways that violate their moral standards 
because such behavior brings self-condemnation.  Self sanctions, thus, 
keep conduct in line with internal standards” (p. 121).   He notes, 
however, that these self-sanctions can be selectively “activated and 
disengaged” to facilitate behavior that would otherwise violate one’s 
own moral standard.  He describes this process of breaking down 
barriers as “moral disengagement”, which can operate through a variety 
of processes: 
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• moral justification,  
• sanitizing language,  
• disavowal of a sense of personal agency by diffusion or 
placement of responsibility, 
• disregarding or minimizing the injurious effects of one's 
actions,  
• attribution of blame to victims, and 
• dehumanization of victims 
 
Bandura (1990167; 2004168) argues that any or all of these can contribute 
to terrorism, but three factors have particular relevance and are 
supported by theory and empirical research both within and beyond a 
“social learning” framework.   
 
Moral Justification:  One way to remove the barrier of self-sanction is to 
change one’s interpretation or appraisal of events so that they justify the 
act.  Terrorists typically have some justification for their action, whether 
it is personally construed or derived from the group’s ideology, “modern 
expressions of violence are indissoluably tied to justification” (Hacker, 
1976169).  Wasmund (1986170) emphasizes the power of collective 
ideology in providing an unquestionable justification for violence:  
“Precisely because group ideology affords terrorists a sense of 
legitimate and moral justification for their actions-the inhibition to kill is 
diminished through it and through it alone- it gains as it were a quasi-
religious character, with a sacrosanct quality.  Doubts are collectively 
suppressed.” 
 
Blaming Victims:  It is generally more acceptable to target aggression at 
people who are considered blameworthy or deserving of retribution or 
“justice.” Terrorists’ rhetoric is often riddled with accusations and 
grievances toward their adversary. The adversary is deserving of 
violence not only because of who they are but because of what they do 
(or did).  Terrorists are indeed collectors of injustices, and they invoke 
and use them to characterize the targets of their violence in ways that 
would justify aggression (at least within the structure of their ideology) 
and make the victim targets appear culpable, provocative, and 
unsympathetic.  Consider, for example, the case Usama bin Laden 
makes for jihad against America:  “The call to wage war against 
America was made because America has spear-headed the crusade 
against the Islamic Ummah, sending thousands of its troops to the land 
of the Two Holy Mosques over and above its meddling in its affairs and 
politics and its support of the oppressive, corrupt, and tyrannical regime 
that is in its control.” 
 
Dehumanizing Victims:  Whether or not there exists some innate 
prohibition against intra-species killing, it certainly seems reasonable to 
conclude that it is more difficult to behave inhumanely toward a victim 
with whom one can identify than one who can be completely vilified and 
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objectified.  “By declaring your enemies ‘nonpersons,’ and by denying 
their human qualities, moral scruples are blocked from the beginning” 
(Wasmund, 1986171).  Terrorist rhetoric and ideologies often cast their 
adversaries in dehumanized terms.  Typically, this either takes the form 
of comparison with unclean an unappealing animals (e.g., pigs) or truly 
demonizing them.  Della Porta (1992172), for example, describes how 
Italian “militants justified their use of political violence by 
depersonalizing their victims, defined in the documents of the 
underground groups as "tools of the system" and, later as ‘pigs’ or 
‘watch dogs’.   Berlet views demonization as a step beyond 
dehumanization, which, he argues, “fuels dualism-a form of binary 
thinking that divides the world into good versus evil with no middle 
ground tolerated” (Berlet, 2004173).  Demonization, in essence,“ is a 
death sentence imposed on the adversary” (Falk, 1988174). 
 
Summary 
  
Not all extremist ideologies facilitate violence, nor are all extremists 
violent.  One potentially useful distinction to consider is the “direction of 
activity;” that is, whether the focus is more on promotion of the “cause” 
or destruction of those who oppose it.   Even within destruction-oriented 
extremism, it usually takes more than ideology to compel violent action.  
Psychological and social influences must erode the powerful, naturally-
occurring barriers that inhibit widespread human killing.  The two main 
avenues of assault on those barriers are :  Outside-In (i.e., effects of the 
group or social environment) and Inside-Out (i.e., making an internal 
cognitive adjustment about how to perceive the environment or 
situation). 
 
What are the vulnerabilities of terrorist 
groups? 
“The same factors that aid in the formation of terrorist organizations may also 
be related to their decline.” – Oots, 1989 
 
Internal Factors 
 
Internal mistrust:  Terrorist organizations must maintain a reasonable 
level of internal security in order carry out operations and even to 
survive.  They must be vigilant against outside infiltration – mindful 
always that they are under surveillance, under pursuit, and subjects of a 
hefty bounty.  In addition to the tactical considerations to guard against 
defection, there are strategic ones as well – acting against the group 
compromises the power of the collective ideology.  Fundamentally, 
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these dynamics create a climate of mistrust.  The result is that “terrorists 
cannot trust one another” (Kellen, 1980175).  The effects on the group: 
 
• the greater the climate of suspicion, the more energy must be 
directed inward and not externally toward operations or goal 
directed activity;  
• a climate of suspicion contributes to interpersonal tension 
throughout the group and also within specific relationships;  
• within group coalitions or alliances may form that breed internal 
competition, erode unity, and disrupt cohesion.   
 
Boredom/ inactivity: Groups are most vulnerable during periods of 
inactivity and when the perceptions of external threat are low.  Threat 
and task-related activity bring group members closer together.  They 
focus less on internal suspicions and tensions and more on their shared 
values and objectives.  Operations generate excitement and unity, but 
the "intervening long periods of inactivity, when group members are 
cooped up somewhere underground, lead to great tensions and violent 
quarrels” (Kellen, 1980176).  This factor is so critical to the functioning of 
terrorist organizations that McCauley and Segal (1989177) caution 
”without action and external threat, the group may destroy itself. “    
 
Internal power competition:  Most groups, at some point, are vulnerable 
to internal power struggles.  Stirrings of dissent may come from a 
variety of sources: concern about a particular decision by the 
leadership, collective restlessness bred by lengthy periods of inactivity, 
or the aggressive actions of a member who has the ability to influence 
others.  Whatever their origin, Oots (1989178) observes that “internal 
struggles for the leadership of the organization are likely to divide the 
organization into factions and lead to its decline as well.”  
 
Major disagreements:  Kellen (1980179) notes that often within terrorist 
groups, “there are big differences of opinion among terrorists on almost 
all subjects- tactical; ethical; the use of force; strategy and tactics; the 
proper assessment of past actions; and so on.”  Conflict, per se, is not 
unusual.  In fact, some argue that in groups it’s the rule rather than the 
exception.   McCauley and Segal (1989180), for example, find that “an 
important factor in the psychosocial reality of terrorist groups is constant 
and pervasive conflict.”  Disagreements typically will have a greater 
impact on small groups or cells than on larger organizations and 
networks.  Within larger groups, effective leaders can manage routine 
diversity and sometimes even mobilize it to their advantage.  What is 
potentially most damaging is any disagreement about core elements of 
doctrine and ideology.  One of the greatest dangers this poses is risk of 
factionalism.  Crenshaw has observed that factionalism within large 
terrorist organizations is common.  “When factionalism develops, the 
organization may cease to function and become instead a number of 
smaller groups, with each pursuing its own political agenda181.”    
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While not formally discussing factionalism, in a classic work, Irving Janis 
(1968182), outlined four conditions found in factions (“units”) that deviate 
from the larger organization: 
 
• “most men in the unit have specific grievances against the 
subordinate organization, and feel resentful toward the top 
leadership for neglecting their needs, for inflicting unnecessary 
deprivations or for imposing extraordinary harsh demands which 
menace their personal welfare; 
 
• the members perceive their group as having no channel open for 
communicating their grievances to the top levels of the hierarchy 
or are convinced that such communications would be wholly 
ineffective in inducing any favorable changes;  
 
• the organization is perceived as having little or no opportunity for 
detecting the deviant behavior in question; and  
 
• one or more central persons in the local unit communicates 
disaffiliative sentiments to the others and sets an example 
contrary to the organization’s norms or by failing to use his power 
to prevent someone else in the same group from doing so.” 
 
External Factors 
 
External support:  No political or ideologically-driven organization can 
survive and thrive without a support network.  “The types of support are 
financial, training, weapons, organizational, and operational.  A group 
must be able to raise the resources necessary to provide sufficient 
incentives to attract and maintain a membership.  Outside support is 
especially crucial to continuance of small terrorist groups” (Oots, 
1989183).  In addition, financial support mechanisms may alter the 
group’s resources and they require transactions, connections, 
communications and activity that can be susceptible to detection.  
“Once terrorists lose their support from silent sympathizers, terrorists 
have difficulty surviving, and this reinforces the effectiveness of cutting 
them off from sources of international funding and logistic support” 
(Kernberg, 2003184).  In considering the implications of support 
vulnerability for counterterrorism, Post and colleagues (2002185) suggest 
that “being familiar with sources of support is important because they 
offer clues to the group’s intentions.…. Changes in the type of support a 
group receives, particularly as support changes from more ideological 
and financial to weapons and operational assistance, are of particular 
concern.” 
   
Constituencies:  The broader populace, which provides expressive and 
instrumental support for the terrorists or sympathy to their cause, 
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comprise the constituency of a terrorist organization.  This can be an 
area of vulnerability because terrorist groups (especially, but not 
exclusively, secular ones) must consider the reactions of their 
constitutency in decisions about targets, tactics, and strategy.  This may 
encourage or inhibit certain kinds of activity.  Changes in the attitudes of 
the supporters can lead to changes in the organization.  Indeed, “a 
group’s constituents or supporters can either deter or encourage 
terrorist activity” (Post, et al., 2002186). 
 
Inter-group Conflict:  It has been noted that conflict is an immutable 
characteristic of terrorist groups; that it is constant and pervasive 
(McCauley & Segal, 1987187).  Beyond the conflict that arises within a 
group, however, there are conflicts that arise between groups that can 
threaten the integrity or even the very existence of the terrorist 
organization.   Other groups may be composed of factions from the 
main organization; separate collectives with similar ideologies vying for 
the same recruits and rewards; or militant groups with competing 
ideologies.  Inter-group conflicts also can occur between the terrorists 
and a government or regime, and these can affect the relative degree of 
ease or difficulty with which the group operates.   
Post (2001188) has suggested that an effective strategy for 
counterterrorism would be for the pursuing governments to exploit some 
of the internal and external vulnerabilities to disrupt the organization.  
Specifically, in congressional testimony, he argued the merits of the 
following long-term strategies: 
 
• Inhibit potential terrorists from joining the group 
• Produce dissension within the group 
• Facilitate exit from the group, 
• Reduce support for the group (Post, 2001189) 
 
There are, of course, also a host of vulnerabilities that are more tactical 
than strategic in character.  These are often used as avenues for 
operational disruption, for example: 
 
• Need for mobility 
• Need to communicate 
• Need to plan and conduct advance work  
• Need to acquire technology and weapons capacity 
• Need to obtain approval or permission 
• Need to store, spend, and move funds 
• Need to transport materials 
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Summary 
 
Terrorist groups, like all social collectives, have certain vulnerabilities to 
their existence.  Some come from within the organization, some operate 
from outside.  Internal vulnerabilities include:  internal mistrust, 
boredom/inactivity, competition for power, and major disagreements.  
Some of the more common external vulnerabilities include:  external 
support, constituencies, and inter-group conflict. 
 
How do terrorist organizations form, 
function, and fail? 
“the group performing the act of terrorism is more significant than the 
individual.”     Crenshaw, 1992  
 
Crenshaw (1985190) notes that there are several core structural 
similarities between political terrorist groups and other nonviolent 
voluntary organizations:  Specifically, she notes the following parallels:  
  
• “The group has a defined structure and processes by which 
collective decisions are made;  
• Members of the organization occupy roles that are functionally 
differentiated;  
• There are recognized leaders in positions of formal authority; and  
• The organization has collective goals which it pursues as a unit, 
with collective responsibility claimed for its actions.”   
 
Another truism about groups, however, is that they are dynamic and 
constantly changing in structure, membership, culture, beliefs, 
perceptions, activity, unity, and dedication.  In this section, we examine 
some observations on how terrorist organizations have changed over 
time, and take a careful look at what is known from the social science 
literature on terrorist recruitment, how groups sustain themselves, the 
role of leadership, and the processes by which terrorist groups decline.   
 
“New” Terrorist Organizations 
 
“Several recent works focus on a “new” terrorism that is motivated by 
religious belief and is more fanatical, deadly, and pervasive than the 
older and more instrumental forms of terrorism the world had grown 
accustomed to (e.g., Laqueur, 1999). This emerging “new” terrorism is 
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thought to differ from the “old” terrorism in terms of goals, methods, and 
organization (see Hoffman, 1999191)” (Crenshaw, 2001192). 
 
“From the end of World War II through the end of the Cold War, terrorist 
groups and activities were driven primarily by nationalistic interests.  
Most of these terrorists had similar, classic patterns:  they belonged to 
discreet groups with hierarchical command structures; clearly defined 
ideology and objectives; that were relatively small in number; and struck 
selectively and primarily at targets selected for their symbolic value, 
rather than their potential to maximize casualties.  After the attack, the 
responsible group often would identify itself and state the reason for the 
violent act.  As Bruce Hoffman has so aptly stated:  “however 
disagreeable or repugnant the terrorists and their tactics may have 
been, we at least knew who they were and what they wanted”  (Borum, 
et al., 2004, p. 421193). 
 
Recruitment 
 
The ability to attract and indoctrinate young new recruits is critical to the 
long-term success of any terrorist organization (Oots, 1989194).  Most 
extremist organizations have a relatively short lifespan; only those that 
thrive and are resilient will survive.  If the organization is persistently 
active in high-risk operations, it is vulnerable to substantial losses from 
the capture, incarceration, or death of its members. 
 
Remarkably little is written in the social science literature about 
recruitment in terrorist organizations.  Most articles that even mention 
the issue have it only as a small piece of a larger analysis.  Of the few 
who have reflected on the topic, one of the consistent themes seems to 
be that processes of recruitment into religious cults – for which there 
has been slightly more social science inquiry – might serve as a useful 
analogue to study the phenomenon among terrorists (Post, 1984195).   
 
Three other promising factors are suggested by the current literature, 
but clearly this is an area in which further research is desperately 
needed.  The three observations are as follows: 
 
Terrorists focus their recruitment where sentiments about perceived 
deprivation are deepest and most pervasive.   
 
This might be viewed through Gurr’s lens of “relative deprivation” or in 
Borum’s model, that which is “not right.”  This observation warrants a 
qualifying caveat, however, which is that not all terrorist organizations 
are looking for the same kinds of people, and different recruiting “pools” 
are more useful in identifying individuals for some kinds of group roles 
than for others.   Most of the literature draws from an era in which 
organizations were less selective about initial recruits than are many 
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organizations of today.  Militant terror networks may still recruit in some 
of the most impoverished, oppressed and destitute places in the world, 
but they do not only recruit there.  Moreover, for militant jihadists, for 
example, the location where sentiments about what is “not right” may be 
strongest and most readily identified and expressed are in religious 
institutions.  Thus, the recruiters’ focus on “areas” of deepest sentiment 
is not necessarily bounded by socioeconomic factors.   
 
Social networks and interpersonal relationships provide critical 
connections for recruitment into terrorist organizations. 
 
One’s network of social relationships and personal connections to 
specific individuals often play a key role in decisions to enter a terrorist 
group.  Sometimes joining itself is a group decision among a young 
cohort.  Della Porta (1992196), for example, notes that among Italian 
extremists, “the decision to join an underground organization was very 
rarely an individual one.  In most cases it involved cliques of friends.  In 
some cases recruitment was determined by the individual’s solidarity 
with an "important" friend who was arrested or had to go underground.”  
More recently, using open source material, Marc Sageman (2004197) 
analyzed the cases of approximately 172 global Salafi mujahedin and 
found that nearly two thirds “joined” the jihad collectively as part of a 
small group (“bunch of guys”) or had a longtime friend who already had 
joined. For most terrorist recruits, their first approach or exposure to the 
terrorist organization comes from someone they know.  In other cases, 
a recruiter may use new recruits to identify other prospects or leverage 
other important relationships to “hook” the individual.  That leverage can 
be emotional (e.g., making the family proud or avenging harm done to a 
loved one) or material (e.g., financial reward that may come to one’s 
family for conducting a martyrdom operation).   
 
Effective terrorist recruiters either identify or impart upon the prospect a 
sense of urgency and imminence to “close the deal.” 
 
As we have noted, terrorist organizations always have a broader base 
of support than the cadre of “members” or active operatives.  Not all 
believers are willing or impelled to act, especially violently.  Terrorist 
organizations are dangerous places.  Minimally, a recruit risks arrest; in 
some cases, certain death.  For many who enter, the decision is not 
fully informed and they understandably are besieged by some 
underlying ambivalence, despite their endorsement of the “cause” 
(Kellen, 1980198).  The recruiter is motivated to impart a sense of 
urgency to the decision, both because it fuels an impetus to action and it 
invokes a powerful dynamic of connection or cohesion to the group.  
Again, in Della Porta’s (1992199) sample of Italian militants, in addition to 
the social network, the other precipitating cause for recruitment was “the 
militants’ perception of a situation of emergency.”  For reasons that 
should be clear from reviewing justifications for violence, a recruit’s 
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connection to the group is a critical foundation for facilitating the ability 
to kill.    
 
Self- Sustaining Functions 
  
“A basic principal of organizational psychology-that the survival of the 
organization is the highest priority-applies fully to terrorist organizations.”  
Post (1989) 
 
Any mission-oriented collective must balance its mission-oriented 
activity with a measure of attention to the functional and relational status 
of the group.   A purely organizational approach to understanding 
extremist groups would argue that maintaining its own existence is its 
sole purpose (Crenshaw, 1985200).  The ideology or mission (and its 
associated activity) simply becomes a means to an end.  While it may 
not be the only motive it certainly is an important consideration.  If the 
group sees itself as the “banner bearer” for the cause, then their 
desistence signals its defeat.  Two of the key tasks in sustaining the 
group are to maintain cohesion (so they are not dissolved by dissention) 
and to maintain loyalty (so that they will not deviate, defect or leave the 
group). 
 
Cohesion Management 
 
Cohesion means sticking together.  The technical use of the term 
derives from a molecular description of a state in which particles of a 
homogenous body are held together.  As long as members are sticking 
together and feeling and acting as part of a “homogenous” body, the 
organization can resist a multitude of internal and external threats.  
What we know about cohesiveness in groups is that it is strongest in 
times of collective activity and perceptions of external threat.  This is 
such a robust finding that even in the 1960s, Janis (1968201) observed 
that “It has long been known that when people are exposed to external 
danger they show a remarkable increase in group solidarity.  That is, 
they manifest increased motivation to retain affiliation with a face-to-face 
group and to avoid actions that deviate from its norms.” This, in part, is 
why good leaders of militant organizations are constantly talking about 
the adversary and reminding members that they are under siege.   
Paradoxically, the threat of the enemy is necessary to sustain the group.  
As framed by Jerrold Post (1989202):  “Terrorist groups require enemies 
in order to cope with their own internal tensions, and if such enemies do 
not exist they create them.”  If group cohesion is not monitored and 
managed either by the leader or the group process, then dissention can 
stir, tensions may rise, and “when a lack of internal cohesiveness leads 
to competition, it can also lead to the decline of the organization” (Oots, 
1989203). 
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Loyalty Management 
  
To ensure its own survival (as well as its tactical success) group 
members must have a sense of allegiance to the organization.  
Although the “mission” of the organization may nominally center on an 
ideology –religious or secular- most often feelings of loyalty and fidelity 
are directed toward people, rather than ideas (Crenshaw, 1992204).  One 
may maintain loyalty to the collective because of personal unwavering 
devotion to a charismatic leader, or, more commonly, because of a 
shared sense of obligation among members.  Loyalty is necessary, not 
only in the hearts and minds of the followers, but in their actions as well.  
Groups have their own rules and standards, and any deviation from 
them may be cast as a betrayal of the group.  Some are deterred from 
deviation or leaving by fear of severe sanctions.  Hans Joachim Klein of 
the Baader-Meinhof said of his own efforts to leave that:  "There is no 
exit except via the cemetery."  Others are kept in line by factors such as 
“mutual interdependence, peer pressure, sensitivity to betrayal, and 
security risks” (Crenshaw, 1992205).   
 
Role of Leadership 
 
“Those who can make you believe absurdities, can make you commit 
atrocities.”  Voltaire 
 
There is an extensive social science literature on the nature of 
leadership; however, very little is written about how or even whether 
leadership in terrorist organizations might be different.  Fundamentally, 
a leader is an agent of influence.  Some leaders hold positions of 
legitimate rank and authority; others count themselves among the rank 
and file.  Effective leaders must attend simultaneously to the task and 
mission of the group, as well as to the processes and relationships 
within it.  One conclusion seems clear about effective group leadership, 
and that is there is not one right way to lead every organization at all 
times. 
 
Strentz (1981206) attempted to construct a psychological portrait of the 
terrorist leader.  According to this profile, “the leader shows the fewest 
signs of self-interest.  This personality is rigid, dedicated, overly 
suspicious, and highly motivated.  She or he projects personal faults 
and inadequacies onto others and ascribes evil motives to those who 
disagree.  The leader is convinced of her righteousness and the 
underlying evil of those who oppose her.  The leaders primary defense 
mechanism is projection.  She specializes.  The leader is dedicated, but 
not as delusional as the paranoid personality.  She or he is not mentally 
ill.  The leader can read people well and appeal to their needs.” 
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In contemporary discourse, discussions of leadership in terrorist 
organizations very often turn quickly to the notion of the “charismatic 
leader.”  Characteristically, such a leader has a confident physical 
presence, is educated, experienced, well spoken and regarded as 
intelligent.  The “charisma” gives these leaders an emotional appeal that 
can motivate the members to action and, which powerfully and uniquely 
fosters unquestioning obedience and loyalty their followers.  
Charismatic people in positions of authority are not always good 
leaders.  Conversely, effective leaders do not necessarily need to be 
charismatic.  Good leaders understand their own strengths and 
weaknesses and structure their environment accordingly.   
 
Crenshaw (1992207) outlines several key leadership tasks that would 
apply to most terrorist organizations.  These provide a useful framework 
through which to examine the role of leadership. 
 
To maintain a collective belief system 
 
“A key role of the leadership is to develop or maintain a collective belief 
system that links overall ideological orientation to the environment in 
which the group operates” (Crenshaw, 1992208).  The leader should be 
able to clearly articulate the vision and mission of the group, 
passionately defend its ideology, and authoritatively keep the group 
ethos stable and cohesive.   The leader should be able to teach and 
persuade others on the tenets of the beliefs system and quickly silence 
any harbingers of disbelief.   
 
To establish and maintain organizational routines 
 
“Once recruits enter such groups, leaders try to teach them a certain set 
of values and to develop organizational routines that make violence 
easier to perform” (Crenshaw, 1992209).  The organization’s leader must 
assume primary responsibility for socializing its members, and 
particularly for providing structure.  Structure in one’s environment and 
routine reduces anxiety and facilitates compliance, as the performance 
of certain tasks becomes almost mechanical.  The leader uses these to 
help maintain a sense of cohesion and collective identity.   
 
To control the flow of communication 
 
As arbiters of the collective belief system, leaders must control 
operational, strategic and doctrinal communication.  They typically 
maintain a “one voice” policy, where dissent and differences are not 
tolerated in public and not encouraged in private.  Even if the leader 
chooses not to be a “hub” of communication or even its primary voice, 
the ultimate mechanism and rules for communication flow must be 
under his or her control.   
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To manipulate incentives (and purposive goals) for followers 
 
“Irrespective of their ideological commitment, the job of the leadership in 
the formative stage of the organization is to develop selective incentives 
that are sufficient to attract members” (Oots, 1989210).  Once engaged in 
the organization, the leader needs to monitor – and modify as needed – 
the incentives (both political and psychological) to determine whether 
they are still “resonating” with the needs of young recruits and whether 
they are sufficient to maintain cohesion and loyalty among the collective 
members.  “Crenshaw points out that a group's leader may even alter 
the purposive goals of the organization in order to maintain the group 
and recruit new members” (Oots, 1989211).   
 
To deflect conflict to external targets 
 
“Because internal conflict threatens group cohesion and identity, the 
leader may try to deflect aggression onto external targets”  (Crenshaw 
1992212).  If, as so many have suggested, conflict in extremist groups is 
constant and pervasive, a leader should have an arsenal of strategies 
not only to deter it, but to manage its potentially destructive influence.  
The task of the leader is to redirect the tension and hostility from within 
the group to without – to aim those energies at the adversary and 
mobilize them in service of a collective goal.   
 
To keep action going 
 
“Leaders must keep the action going or lose control of their followers” 
(Crenshaw 1992213).  We have already noted that periods of inactivity 
create peak experiences of vulnerability for terrorist groups.  Leaders 
keep the group vigilant and mindful of how wicked the adversary truly is 
and how grave of a threat they pose, not just to the mission, but also to 
the group’s very existence.  By keeping actions and planning at a 
constant pace, the group’s attention continues to be focused outwardly, 
and it is difficult to sustain an environment where dissent might fester.   
 
The leader of a terrorist organization must constantly concern and 
preoccupy him or herself with each of these tasks, as “the loss of 
leadership may bring about the disintegration of the terrorist group” 
(Oots, 1989214). 
 
Decline of Organizations 
 
No organization can expect to endure forever.  No extremist 
organization can expect to make it through the first year unless it either 
has extraordinarily good fortune, competent leadership and nurturance 
or both.   According to David Rapoport, 90% of nascent terrorist groups 
last less than a year.  Among the terrorist organizations with any staying 
power, the ethno nationalist groups  - with their lucid objectives and 
Psychology of Terrorism 63
ready pool of available support - have fared reasonably well, despite 
consistent failure to achieve their ultimate objectives (Hoffman, 1999215). 
 
There are numerous pathways by which a terrorist organization is 
eliminated or falls into decline.  Some are cannibalized by internal 
vulnerabilities and conflicts; others are decimated by government 
disruption 
 
Crenshaw describes three sources or mechanism of organizational 
decline among terrorist groups216: 
 
• Defeat: The organization is destroyed physically 
• Strategic shift:  The group makes a rational decision to abandon 
terrorism in favor of other modes of political behavior.  
• Internal disintegration:  Internal factors, e.g., dissatisfaction of 
members, attrition through death, result in the organization's 
demise. 
 
Ross and Gurr conceptualize the pathways to decline somewhat 
differently.  They have posed the following four sources of decline217: 
 
• Preemption. The authorities make it impossible for the group to 
act. 
• Deterrence. The authorities increase the costs and risks to the 
group. 
• Burnout. Members commitment to the organization and its goal 
diminish 
• Backlash. Political support for the organization declines. 
 
Summary 
  
The primary objective of any group is to maintain its own survival or 
existence as a collective. Its long-term success depends on its ability to 
ability to attract and indoctrinate a steady stream of young new recruits.  
Surprisingly little research or analysis has been conducted on terrorist 
recruitment.  Three tentative conclusions are as follows:  (1) Terrorists 
focus their recruitment where sentiments about perceived deprivation 
are deepest and most pervasive; (2) Social networks and interpersonal 
relationships provide critical connections for recruitment into terrorist 
organizations; and (3) Effective terrorist recruiters either identify or 
impart upon the prospect a sense of urgency and imminence to “close 
the deal.”  The group must be able to maintain both cohesion and 
loyalty.  Effective leaders of terrorist organizations must be able to: 
maintain a collective belief system; establish and maintain 
organizational routines; control the flow of communication; manipulate 
incentives (and purposive goals) for followers; deflect conflict to external 
targets; and keep action going. 
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Section 
6  
Conclusions on the State of 
Research  
 
Terrorism is a relatively recent topic of interest in the field of psychology.  
“The Psychological Abstracts, the most authoritative compendium of 
academic publications psychology, listed no reference to terrorism or 
related terms, such as ‘hostages’ or ‘hijacking,’ until the end of 1981.  
By this criterion, academic psychology recognized terrorism as a subject 
worthy of consideration only in 1982.  In that year, Psychological 
Abstracts listed ten publications under this topic.”  Ariel Merari218
 
General conclusions 
The objective of this review was not primarily to provide a detailed 
methodologically-based critique of social science research in the field of 
terrorism studies.  Rather, our goal was to explore what questions 
pertaining to terrorist groups and behavior had been asked by social 
science researchers; to identify the main findings from that research; 
and attempt to distill and summarize them within a framework of 
operationally relevant questions.   
 
Regarding an appraisal on the “state of the research,” our incidental 
critique is akin to taking its temperature.  Based on this review, 
however, the prognosis is not particularly favorable.  This is particularly 
true if one is interested in research that might directly inform 
counterterrorism operations.  Several rigorous, comprehensive reviews 
of the existing literature have been conducted at various intervals over 
the past fifteen years.  The researchers come from diverse orientations, 
but their conclusions are strikingly similar, and unfortunately, consistent 
over time: 
 
• “There are probably few areas in the social science literature in 
which so much is written on the basis of so little research.  
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Perhaps as much as 80 percent of the literature is not research-
based in any rigorous sense….”  (Schmid & Jongman, 1988219) 
 
• “With a few clusters of exceptions there is, in fact, a disturbing 
lack of good empirically-grounded research on terrorism”  (Gurr, 
1988, p.2).  “This may well be an understatement”  
(Merari,1991220). 
 
• “Ultimately, terrorism research is not in a healthy state. It exists 
on a diet of fast food research: quick, cheap, ready-to-hand and 
nutritionally dubious….. It was found that the problems identified 
in1988 remain as serious as ever” (Silke, 2001221). 
 
Certain general conclusions can be discerned about the current state of 
research on psychology of terrorism: 
 
There still is no agreed upon definition of terrorism 
 
By the late 1980s, there were more than 100 definitions of terrorism 
that had appeared in the professional literature222.  Some 
researchers are concerned that without a common definition, it 
won’t be possible for the field to systematically accumulate a body 
of knowledge. 
 
Most of the existing research is not empirical or based on any data 
 
Andrew Silke (2001223) systematically reviewed all terrorism 
research published in the field’s primary journals during the five-
year period from 1995-99.  More than 80% of the articles were 
“thought pieces” or based on information taken from media 
sources, with less than 20% providing substantially new knowledge 
based on previously unavailable data.  Moreover, “just over three 
per cent of research papers in the major terrorism journals involved 
the use of inferential analysis…Terrorism articles rarely incorporate 
statistics and when they do they are nearly five times more likely to 
be just descriptive statistics. Barely one article in 30 published in 
the past five years incorporated inferential analysis.”  The reasons 
for this relative lack of empirical inquiry are varied, but include 
difficulty gaining access to terrorists as subjects for research 
(because they may be dead, underground, or incarcerated) and 
inability of many academic researchers to access classified data or 
information. 
 
Existing research is largely inapplicable to operational 
considerations 
 
Merari (1991224) has aptly characterized the limitations of academic 
contributions to terrorism studies:  “Academic contributions on 
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terrorism have often been occasional and amateurish, lacking in 
factual knowledge of the subject matter.  Many of them are too 
theoretical to have an applicability value and some are too 
speculative to be reliable.  It seems that the majority of the 
academic contributions in this area have been done by people 
whose main research interests lie elsewhere, who felt that they had 
something to say on this juicy and timely subject. Usually, a 
contribution of this kind is well-grounded in the empirical and 
theoretical findings of the writer's particular area of expertise, but 
lacking in knowledge of terrorism.”  
 
The Bottom Line 
 
In 1989, Jerrold Post reflected on the state of our research-based 
knowledge of terrorist behavior.  His conclusion was that: ”Our 
understanding of terrorist psychology is primitive at best.  Nevertheless, 
behavioral scientists attempting to understand terrorist psychology are 
making encouraging-if halting- progress in developing an evidence-
based knowledge base concerning the psychology of terrorists” 
(Post,1989225) 
 
Based on a review of the subsequent research, in 2000 Andrew Silke 
(2001226) concluded that:  “Our knowledge of terrorism most certainly is 
deficient but the field shows no clear ability to improve this situation. 
After 30 years of study, we simply should know more about terrorism 
than we currently do. That we continue to languish at this level of 
ignorance on such a serious subject is a cause of grave concern.”   
 
Future directions 
Although Merari (1991227) has been highly critical of psychologists’ 
contributions to terrorism research, he also has suggested two potential 
avenues for more productive inquiry:  “(1) In-depth studies of the 
specific terrorist groups, describing ideology, motivations, structure, 
decision-making processes, demographic and personality 
characteristics, etc. (2) Problem oriented studies cutting across time and 
places.  These are basically comparative studies looking into issues 
such as conditions leading to escalation in the level of terrorist violence, 
anti terrorism legislation, the utility of deterrence as applied to terrorist 
groups and to terrorism-sponsoring states, factors influencing the 
success of amnesty programs for terrorists, political negotiations with 
terrorist groups, hostage negotiations, etc..” 
 
Perhaps the clearest vision of a future research agenda on the 
psychology of terrorism is provided by one of the field’s pioneers, 
Martha Crenshaw.  Her appraisal is as follows:  “The study of terrorism 
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should go beyond a concentration on current events or speculation 
about the future to develop systematic analysis of the development of 
the phenomenon over time.  First, little is known about why the users of 
terrorism would abandon the strategy.  Research should try to identify 
the psychological incentives for giving up violence.  A second area for 
fruitful research concerns the development of strategies of terrorism. In 
particular, what leads to innovation in terrorist behavior, such as 
hostage-takings or the resort to weapons of mass destruction?  Another 
research area that has been neglected is the study of decision-making 
in the area of counter terrorism (see also Crenshaw, 1990). What is 
needed is an investigation of the effects of different policies on a range 
of groups with different motivations, organizational structures, and social 
relationships.  An additional research concern is the public reaction to 
terrorism.  Last, the study of psychological motivations for terrorism, as 
well as for ending terrorism, should continue to be based on a model 
that integrates the individual, the group, and society” (Crenshaw, 
2001228). 
 
Based on the profound limitations in operational relevance encountered 
in the present review, we would advance the recommendation that 
research should be designed and conducted to answer key questions of 
operational interest to professionals who work to prevent and counter 
terrorism.  In academic circles, the nature and extent of partnerships 
between researchers and government counterterrorism agencies is a 
matter of some debate.  While there are reasonable scientific and 
professional arguments on both sides of the issue, our concern here 
has less to do with advancing the scientific study of the social 
phenomenon of terrorism than it does with the desire for prevention and 
interdiction strategies to be informed by the results of systematic inquiry.   
We suggest that a model of operational research be applied to address 
some critical questions in counterterrorism research.  That research 
model is based on the following principles229: 
 
 First, the research endeavor must be operationally-informed.  The 
design of the inquiry must begin with an understanding of the key 
ultimate questions that end users (e.g., investigators, intelligence 
analysts, defense and security decision-makers) routinely are 
required to answer, the threshold decisions they are required to 
address, and the environment in which that process occurs.   
 
 Second, the study should maintain a behavior-based focus.  When 
exploring the realm of terrorism, or other violent behavior, it may 
seem intriguing or even tempting to speculate about the personality 
or internal dynamics of the actors.  These questions may have 
some theoretical or even scientific merit, but they are unlikely to 
produce operationally-relevant findings. 
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Third, the interpretation or lessons from the study must derive from 
an analysis of incident-related behaviors.  This means that facts 
should drive conclusions.  Those designing and analyzing the 
research should recognize that preconceived notions, assumptions, 
or conventional wisdom may be wrong.  One of the major 
objectives of research is to submit ideas and hypotheses to critical 
scrutiny.  Operational research should set aside preconceptions 
about what “causes” the behavior, and redirect interest to what 
behaviors precede the outcome.   
 
We believe that applying this research method to cases of terrorism 
could produce findings that would help to guide information 
gathering, intelligence analysis, resource deployment, identification 
of inter-systems relationships, and information integration.  Those 
advances can lead to more effective use of information in the 
intelligence-driven war against the new terrorism.  
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